Cuban Missile Crisis: some resources
The CD- rom The Troubled Century has a feature where many of the crises of the Cold War can be 'role-played' from the
perspective of some of the main protagonists, including one on the Cuban Missile Crisis. After working through the sources, the narrative of the crisis, and the role-play, as either Kennedy or Krushchev, an 'interactive' feature of the CD-rom pupils asks pupils to make judgements on the motives of the two men. By moving markers across the screen, they can assess the comparative importance of the different motives which influenced the two men during the crisis (fear of war, reputation, ideology, economic motives, political pressure, public opinion, 'lessons in history'). Once the pupils have made their judgements, they are told to click on a button 'so see how your ratings compare with historian's ratings', implying that there is a consensus amongst historians on this matter. (Compare this with, for example, Ben Walsh's textbook,
Modern World History, [John Muray, pp. 293-298] which puts forward several different hypotheses on the motives of the two men, and also raises interesting questions about 'who won?' in the crisis). According to the CD-rom, with Kennedy, the motives were political pressure and public opinion (with no other factors having any influence). In the case of Krushchev, according to the CD-rom, all historians believe that he was motivated by political pressure, ideology and concern for his reputation. This is clearly a travesty of what history is, but it is a good example of a flaw in new technology resources providing a very good opportunity for history teachers to make a powerful point about what history is and what it is not.
After letting pupils go through the materials (the roleplay can be done as a whole class activity if you have whole class projection facilities in a classroom), the pupils can be given materials which 'problematise' the crisis, in terms of showing that there were very differing views and interpretations of events, and of the motives of the 2 men. This can be done either by sub-contracting groups to study different websites about the crisis and then discuss their findings and compare notes, or by providing them with quotes from different sources about the crisis.
The following sites offer different 'perspectives' on the crisis. One is a U.S school-oriented site, one is the U.S. National Security Agency's site, one focuses on people's recollections and reminiscences about the crisis, one is The Marxist History Organisation site, and the fifth is the Public Record Office's education site. (There are obviously many other sites which could be used, and many other historical issues where this technique could be used.
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The following table provides another 'collection' of sources designed to 'problematise' a historical issue. After going through the CD-rom activities on
The Troubled Century, pupils can be given a selection of the sources below to make the point that there is no consensus about motives and outcomes on the Cuban Missile Crisis, or just about any other historical event.
| Remember the words of JFK to his brother in the ante-room of the Oval Office the night before the Cuban Missile Crisis, now declassified, 'I have to do it Bobby', said John Kennedy, explaining why he was facing up to the Soviets, 'I'll lose the presidency if I don't.' |
Quoted in 'This time I'm scared', Maggie O' Kane, Guardian , 5 December 2002. |
| 'Historians disagree about why Krushchev tried to place the missiles on Cuba. Doing so certainly gave the lie to those of his critics who said that he was being too soft on the USA. Had the plan succeeded it would have restored Krushchev's credit in the Presidium. He was concerned about the 'missile-gap' that existed between the USSR and the USA, and knew that by installing medium and intermediate range missiles in Cuba, he was narrowing the gap without having to go to the expense of building long range missiles. He may have wanted to use the missiles as a bargaining counter, promising to withdraw them if the Americans would recognise East Germany. Whatever his motives, the result was a personal disaster for him and the crisis contributed to his downfall in 1964.' |
Warnes, D. (1984) Russia: a modern history, London, University Tutorial Press: 141. |
| 'The main thing was that the installation of our missiles in Cuba would, I thought, restrain the United Nations from precipitous military action against Castro's government. In addition to protecting Cuba, our missiles would have equalised what the West likes to call 'the balance of power'. The Americans had surrounded our country with military bases and threatened us with nuclear weapons and now they would learn what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing at you.' |
Krushchev, N. (1971) Krushchev Remembers, Andre Deutsch: 494. |
| 'Our position was this: we would withdraw our missiles from Cuba on condition that the United States would make a public statement, pledging not to invade Cuba and promising to restrain the allies from doing so.. We behaved with dignity and forced the USA to demobilise and to recognise Cuba... Cuba still exists today as a result of the correct policy conducted by the Soviet Union when it rebuffed the United States. I'm proud of what we did.' |
Krushchev, N. (1974) Krushchev Remembers, the last testament, Andre Deutsch: 511-2. |
| 'Both leaders emerged with something from the crisis. Kennedy came out of the crisis with a greatly improved reputation in his own country
and throughout the West. He had stood up to Krushchev and had made him back down. Kreshchev was also able to claim a personal triumph. Cuba remained a useful ally in 'Uncle Sam's backyard'. The fact that Krushchev had been forced to back down was quickly forgotten in Soviet circles. Instead, his role as a respoinsible peacemaker, willing to take the first move towards compromise was highlighted.' |
Walsh, B. (1996) Modern World History , London, John Murray: 298. |
| 'Whatever its causes, Kennedy had come out of the crisis with a greatly improved reputation in his own country and throughout the West. He had acted quickly and firmly; he had contolled the hotheads in his own government and armed forces. He had stood up to the Russians and he had won. Or had he? Before the crisis Castro had declared himself to be a Marxist but Cuba was not a communist state.. After the crisis, Cuba was as dependent on Russian aid and protection as any of the Eastern European satellites.' |
Howarth, T. (1979) The World since 1900 , London, Longman: 244. |
| 'By and large they (Russia and America) have accepted that they each have 'areas of influence and control' and that they will not threaten each other's vital interests. For example, in 1962, Krushchev finally withdrew Soviet missiles from Cuba because he realised that the USA felt strongly enough about this issue to fight a war over it.' Similarly, the USA made no serious attempt to interfere when the Soviet Union invaded Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968.' |
Fisher, P. and Williams N. (1989) Past into Present 3, London, Collins: 103) |
| 'Kennedy's campaign for the presidency in 1960 may have contibuted to the coming of the missile crisis. To bolster his chances of reaching the White House, JFK pointed to the Eisenhower's administration's failure to prevent Castro's rise to power, and promised to make amends by overthrowing the Cuban leader, if elected. Kennedy, therefore, probably authorised the Bay of Pigs operation in part to make good on his election promise. Kreshchev's fear after the Bay of Pigs that Kennedy would try once again to remove Castro, but on the next occasion use American force directly to ensure success, was one of the key factors behind his decision to install missiles on Cuba.' |
White, M. (1966) The Cuban Missile Crisis, London, Macmillan: 233) |
| 'So anxious was he (Kennedy) not to damage the future world prospect by any humiliation of Krushchev that he completely failed to bring home to the American people the magnitude of the victory which he had won.' |
Jenkins, R. (1963) Portrait of a president, Observer, reprinted, 12 January 2003. |
| 'In the atmosphere of the Cold War, one country always looks for pressure points against the other country, but in this case, it was not only to put pressure on the other country, but to try to protect a small country that was being bullied.' |
Oleg Troyanovsky, Special Advisor to Krushchev (quoted in The Cuban Missile Crisis, UK History Channel, 23 December 2002. |
| 'America deployed its Jupiter missiles in Turkey, Italy and Germany; they could do it, why couldn't we do it, to defend the Cuban Revolution?' |
Anatoly Gribnov, Soviet Chief of Missiles Operations, Cuba. Quoted in above programme. |
| 'President Kennedy, still smarting from the failure of his invasion of the Bay of Pigs the previous year, was taunted with being soft on communism. He was stung by accusations that he was putting American security at risk. |
Narrator, as above. |
| 'Are we going to decide to eliminate the Cuban problem by eliminating the island?' |
Dean Rusk, US Secretary of State, as above. |
| 'This is the greatest defeat in our history Mr President, we should invade Cuba today.' |
US military Chief Curtis Le May, at the end of the crisis, as above. |
| 'The military were not satisfied with results, they'd only got the removal of the missiles.. the US military thought that Kennedy had given away too much, had let them off too easy.' |
General William Smith, Asst. US Chief of Staff, as above. |
| 'This was most humiliating for us, I still believe that to this day... the military really resented it.' |
Anotoly Gribnov, Russian General, as above. |
| 'Krushchev failed in that the missiles were withdrawn and in a way which was humiliating, but he did not fail in that America agreed not to attack Cuba, which still stands and inadvertantly, it also led to a better climate between Russia and America. |
Oleg Troyanovsky, Special Advisor to Krushchev (quoted in The Cuban Missile Crisis, UK History Channel, 23 December 2002. |
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