Growing up in Ethiopia and Andhra Pradesh – how is increasing participation in social protection schemes affecting girls’ roles and responsibilities?

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About the Author
Laura Camfield is a Lecturer in International Development in the School of International Development at the University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Contact:
Email L.Camfield@uea.ac.uk
School of International Development
University of East Anglia
Norwich, NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom
Tel: +44(0)1603 591885
Fax: +44(0)1603 451999

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University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0)1603 592329
Fax: +44 (0)1603 451999
Email: dev.general@uea.ac.uk
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Abstract

The focus of this paper is the effect on adolescent girls’ roles and responsibilities of public works schemes or cash transfers, which are the main forms of social protection in developing countries. Increasing participation in social protection is intended to enhance the development of girls in participating households, but evidence on their school participation and workloads suggests that the reverse may be happening. The paper probes what happens to girls’ roles and responsibilities when households participate in social protection schemes in rural Ethiopia and Andhra Pradesh. It argues that effects are complex, and often context-specific, however, the assumption that ‘beneficiaries’ benefit means that negative impacts are rarely acknowledged. Nonetheless, the most important question to ask is not ‘do schemes increase girls’ work?’ but ‘how do they change the nature of girls’ work and its relation to other valued dimensions of their lives?’ The paper combines review and analysis of quantitative and qualitative data, recognising that this question cannot be answered with a methodology that considers girls’ schooling or workloads in isolation.

Introduction

Adolescent girls are often key contributors to family life, providing labour, care and in some cases income (e.g. Nieuwenhuys, 1994, Ilahi, 2001a, de Graff and Levison, 2009). The International Labour Organization (2009) estimates that, globally, 23 per cent of girls aged fifteen to seventeen years old do household chores for 28 hours a week or more (see also Webbink et al, 2012). Survey data collected in 2009 by Young Lives, a longitudinal study of childhood poverty1 also suggests large workloads for girls aged fourteen to fifteen in rural Andhra Pradesh who spend nearly three hours per day on domestic work or caring for others. The invisibility of daily reproductive work (Elson, 1999; Waring, 1997) mean that girls’ contributions are not valued or taken into account by development policy makers or planners. Nonetheless, their care of younger and older household members can free the labour of adult women to engage in new economic opportunities, particularly where there is no affordable childcare (Lokshin et al, 2000). The examples of social protection schemes used in this paper are the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme

1 www.younglives.org.uk/what-we-do
(NREGS) in rural India, which has been successful in both recruiting women (51 per cent of participants, Reddy et al, 2010) and increasing agricultural wage rates for non-participating women, and the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in rural Ethiopia. As I discuss later in the paper, these schemes aim to reduce the vulnerability of households and increase their social mobility without specifying how this is to be done. They also fail to acknowledge the potential trade-off between productive and reproductive activities, or the likelihood that this trade-off will disproportionately affect women and girls. While one might expect greater sensitivity from conditional cash transfer schemes (CCTs) – welfare programmes that are conditional on the recipient performing actions that benefit the ‘target’ child – the literature review reported later in this section found mixed effects on girls’ work, depending on their age and whether they or their sibling are the target of the grant (Barrero-Osoria et al, 2008). The paper reviews literature and uses quantitative and qualitative data collected by Young Lives over the period in which these programmes were operating (2005 onwards) to explore whether social protection schemes are partially responsible for the premature transfer of responsibilities for social reproduction to the next generation.

Conceptual framework
The paper explores the complex relationship between social protection schemes and social reproduction, defined following Bakker (2007:471) as incorporating biological reproduction, education, socialisation, and care. It uses Power’s (2004) concept of ‘social provisioning’ to highlight the exclusion of girls’ caring and unpaid labour – what Waring (1997:31) describes as ‘most of the work that most of the people do most of the time’ – from evaluations of the outcomes of social protection schemes. Power argues that social provisioning ‘allows for a broader understanding of economic activities ... motivation ... [and] the importance of social norms’ (2004:7). It also enables exploration of how ‘culture, ideology and social institutions help determine the specific organisation of provisioning at a given movement’ (ibid:7), for example, how gender and age affect decisions about who is withdrawn from school to provide care to sick family members. Finally, it illustrates how ‘organisation of social provisioning interacts with and changes the social environment’ (ibid:7), for example, by reducing the future human capital of girls through overwork and limited access to formal schooling.

The attention to motivation within the concept of ‘social provisioning’ has resonances with Donath’s (2000:116-7) characterisation of the ‘other economy’ which is ‘concerned with the direct production and maintenance of human beings... [and] functions by gifts and reciprocity rather than by exchange’. As Folbre (1995) has

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22 For example, they aim to increase female participation in paid work, but do not adequately address the absence of childcare. Similarly, they fail to acknowledge the vulnerability implicit in wage payments that are not indexed to inflation.
argued in relation to ‘caring labour’, the behaviour of individuals in this economy cannot be explained by economic rationality because ‘they act in ways which are consistent with norms, expectations and beliefs, both their own and those which are imposed by external forces’ (Donath, 2000:117). For this reason girls may not view participation in family work as negative: Martin (2010:40) describes how in Andhra Pradesh ‘children [aged fourteen to sixteen] recognize that their increasing work is linked to ‘growing up’ and are contributing to family life similarly to their parents, rather than being dependent like younger siblings are. The data suggests, therefore, that work plays an important role in family integration and the transition to adulthood’.

The final author I draw on is Waring (1997:31) who highlights the invisibility of the work of women and girls to the conventional economic measures that underpin the design of poverty alleviation programmes. Her analysis of Nepal’s Agriculture Perspective Plan is a telling example of how the lack of gender sensitivity in programming means that ‘mothers-in-law, sisters, and, overwhelmingly, daughters are required to assist with the additional workload. For this they are withdrawn from school, and the cycle of non-literacy, overwork, poverty, and anaemia is regenerated’ (see Jones and Holmes, 2011 for examples from social protection). Niewenhuys makes a similar argument in her ethnography of a Keralan fishing village where she attempts to reclaim the activity that ‘does not count and has no name’ (1994:205), i.e. children’s productive and reproductive labour, which is nonetheless the basis of the rural economy. Wells’ (2009:101) analysis of children’s work argues similarly that the majority of girl’s work occurs within an ‘economy of care’ - the hidden tasks of cleaning, food processing and preparation, and caring for siblings. This may explain why ‘the valuation of girls’ work is so low that it has been ‘discovered’ by feminist anthropologists making a conscious choice to include housework and child care in their definition of work’ (Nieuwenhuys, 1996:243).

**What do we know so far about the factors that affect girls’ work?**

I conducted a comprehensive review of literature, primarily from economists and anthropologists, on the impact on adolescent girls’ workloads of social protection schemes, community-level or household ‘shocks’, and new economic opportunities (tables one and two, appendix). The focus of the paper is the impact of social protection schemes, which represents a considerable body of literature (table one). However, these schemes do not operate isolation from other factors and by widening the lens it will be possible to see how these factors intersect in ways that can increase girls’ workloads (table two). One provisional conclusion is that while CCTs have

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3 Adato (2007) maintains that few qualitative studies on the impact of social protection schemes have been published, even in Latin America where CCTs originated (examples include Adato, 2000, Adato et al, 2000, Adato, 2007, Molyneux and Thompson, 2010, Streuli, 2010). While most studies focus on women’s experience of participation rather than girls’, the way programmes can reinforce gender roles and obscure increases in women’s labour (Molyneux, 2006) is clearly relevant to this paper.
mixed effects on girls’ work, schemes such as PSNP or NREGS that are conditional on labour rather than child outcomes always increase unpaid domestic work carried out by girls. While CCTs produced declines in child work in Ecuador, Cambodia, Honduras and Bangladesh (albeit often based on the evidence of a single study), this was not the case in Uruguay, Ethiopia and India, and there was conflicting evidence for Brazil, Nicaragua, Mexico and Colombia (table one). There were also differences in impact by age and gender, for example, Carpio and Macours (2009) found that Red de proteccion in Nicaragua reduced the work of older boys, and boys who were behind in school (indicating that recipients used the grant to respond to the needs of particular children within the household), but not older girls. Where these differences did not exist, it was usually because the data had not been or could not be disaggregated (e.g. Perova and Vakis, 2009, Peru), or the authors had defined child work as paid labour, outside the home (e.g. Edmonds, 2004, South Africa). Studies of children’s experiences of social protection programmes clearly show the redistribution of domestic and other work, typically among female members of the household that takes place to accommodate the requirements of the programmes (c.f. Waring, 1997). For example, Streuli (2010) describes how one of the effects of Juntos, a Peruvian CCT conditional on children’s school attendance, was that older girls who would have previously migrated to continue their education or work remained in the community to help their younger siblings, illustrating the differential effects of social protection on differently aged siblings. Adato et al (2000:62) similarly describe how women’s workload has increased in response to children’s school attendance: ‘when asked who does the child’s work when s/he is in school, a promotora [community organizer] from Hidalgo said: ‘Well, us [...] I have to do all my housework, because I prefer that my son study. So that one day he can pass the exam.’

Social protection programmes interact with other factors that affect girls’ work (table two), for example, acquisition of labour intensive assets such as livestock (Cockburn and Dostie, 2007), creation of new markets (e.g. for ready-made food) from cash grants and changing working practices, and changes in the structure of the existing labour market in a way that benefits women (for example, by increasing wage rates or reducing labour supply). When women enter the labour market, girls often take on their responsibility for ‘social provisioning’, for example, in Peru (Ilahi et al, 2001b:4) or Ethiopia where respondents discussed ‘the frequent problem of girls’ absence from school due to pressures to cook and care for siblings, substituting for mothers who often have to juggle extra-household work or market activities as well as community work’ (Woldehanna et al, 2008:187). Similar pressures have been reported in relation to economic interventions such as the Suki Agricultural project in Howa, Sudan which shifted the mode of production from subsistence farming to cash-cropping on tenancies (according to Katz (2004:84) this is an example of ‘‘development’ tak[ing] place on the backs of children’). Carpena-Mendez (2007) and Beazley (2007) describe how male migration in rural Mexico and Indonesia respectively caused girls to take on their mothers’ roles, often becoming de-facto
household heads, so their mothers could substitute for absent males (a phenomenon observed by Ansell, 2005, in other developing and transition economies). Finally, Punch (2007) describes how while the schooling of younger siblings in rural Bolivia benefits from older siblings’ income from migration, they may also be constrained by the need to care for their aging parents rather than migrate for more lucrative employment.

There are counter-examples where economic opportunities have not impacted on girls’ work. Degraff and Levison (2009:1582) suggest that while mothers entering the labour market in Brazil increases the likelihood that their children will work, this is because children follow their example, rather than because they take over their caring role. Nonetheless, if there is no childcare, as is the case on most PSNP or NREGS work sites, it seems likely that older girls will be pulled away from other activities to care for siblings. For example, Lokshin et al (2010) found that high childcare costs in Kenya reduced maternal employment and girls’ schooling since if women did work then their daughters had to care for younger siblings. This is one of the reasons why across a range of settings having younger siblings, especially boys, had a negative impact on girls’ workload and the likelihood of their attending school (table two). National or community-level shocks can increase girls’ workload, as shown by crises in Latin America in the 1990s and the recent financial crisis, and household level shocks such as unemployment are more likely to impact on girls than boys. Family illness not only reduces the likelihood that older girls will remain in school, but also increases their caring responsibilities, as can be seen in the qualitative case studies in the final part of the paper.

**Methodology**

The analysis uses Ethiopian and Indian (Andhra Pradesh) data from Young Lives, a study of childhood poverty in four countries (Ethiopia, India, Peru, and Vietnam). The quantitative data is drawn from the third round of data collection in 2009, when the children in the cohort discussed in this paper were fourteen to fifteen years old. The qualitative data comes from the second round of data collection in 2008 (Tafere et al, 2009; Vennam, 2009) and a sub-study on social protection in 2009, which was developed and managed by the author. This means that the research design is essentially cross-sectional and does not look at how children’s workloads have changed over time, or attempt to attribute these changes to household participation in social protection schemes. While it compares the workloads of children in households who are or are not participating in social protection schemes, it recognizes that there may be other factors such as material poverty that affect both the decision to participate and children’s workloads.

The Ethiopian sample covers twenty sites in the four most populous regions and the capital, Addis Ababa, thirteen of which are classified as rural (Outes-Leon and
Dercon 2008). The Indian sample covers twenty sites across six districts of Andhra Pradesh and the capital, Hyderabad; fifteen are classified as rural (Kumra, 2008). The sample is described in table three below. Points to note are that although a higher percentage of girls are enrolled in school in rural Ethiopia, they are progressing more slowly through the grades. This may be due to starting school later (age 7-8 vs. 4-6 in India) and to having a higher workload, expressed both in the smaller percentages of children not working in Ethiopia and the significant differences between Ethiopia and India in the hours spent working in addition to schooling.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics for schooling and work for female students in rural areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural sample in 2009</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Female</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% girls enrolled in school</td>
<td>87% (whole sample 85%)</td>
<td>71% (whole sample 75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean highest female grade</td>
<td>5⁵</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of girls not doing paid or farm work</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of girls not doing any work</td>
<td>1 girl</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours female students spent working each day</td>
<td>&gt; 5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Ethiopian qualitative data was collected from children in four rural sites in 2008 and 2009: Tach-Meret, in a food-insecure area in Amhara, Leki, near Lake Ziway in Oromia and producing vegetables for sale, Zeytuni, a drought-prone area in Tigray which is dependent on government support, and Buna⁶, a coffee-growing area in SNNP. Corresponding data from Andhra Pradesh was collected in three rural sites: Katur, a drought-prone near-rural village in Anantapur district, Poompuhar, a near-rural village in Mahabubnagar district, which grows cotton for sale, and Patna, a remote tribal village in Srikakulam district. The qualitative dataset includes individual and group activities with children and adults and fieldworker observations, although in this paper I mainly use data from interviews with children, triangulated with data from other sources, including my fieldnotes. The participants were interviewed in a location of their choice by researchers of the same gender who spoke the same language and whom they had met previously.

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⁵ The correct grade for this age group would be eight or nine, given that they should have started in grade one aged seven.

⁶ Buna participated in the social protection study in 2009, which revisited Young Lives children who participated in a similar study in 2008 funded by the International Development Research Centre.
The quantitative analysis for the whole rural sample (n=647 girls from twenty-eight villages) is supported by analysis of the interview data for the qualitative sub-sample (thirty-one girls from seven villages, table four, appendix). All of sixteen girls in the Ethiopian sub-sample and the majority of the fifteen girls\(^7\) in the Indian sub-sample work in the home or outside. Three-quarters of their households participate in PSNP or NREGS which is higher than the percentage in the whole rural sample (38 per cent PSNP, 71 per cent NREGS). Less than 20 per cent of girls only do domestic work, which includes activities outside the home such as collecting wood and water and drying dung. Two thirds of the sample does farm or paid work\(^8\), but only a third of these girls work on NREGS or PSNP. In half of these cases work on NREGS or PSNP is in combination with other paid activities, which suggests that they are not the main motivations for girls' working outside the home. Since the money or grain from NREGS and PSNP is usually given to the household head (but not always – see Triveni in the following section) no-one had control of this income in the same way as with the smaller amounts they earned through daily labour. Nonetheless, some of them described how money from the schemes had been spent on their clothing or school supplies, or on food they shared. In the remainder of the section I briefly summarize key characteristics of the schemes (table five) and look at the implications for social reproduction of their aims and outcomes.

### Table 5: Characteristics of PSNP and NREGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PSNP</th>
<th>NREGS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Start date</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>8.3 million households</td>
<td>45 million households in Andhra Pradesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Food or cash for public works such as digging ditches, or direct support to households with no adult labour. Fixed work demand related to the number of household members covered by the scheme (~5 days per household member per month)</td>
<td>Cash for public works such as breaking/moving stones, paid to every adult household member who can work on a designated day. Provides up to 100 days work per household member per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remuneration</td>
<td>10 ETB per person, per day or 3kg cereal</td>
<td>Rs 121 per person per day, proportionate to work done by work group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges</td>
<td>Selection of participating households and the extent of ‘elite capture’ (e.g. Caeyers and Dercon 2008), the timing and size of the payment in a context of rising food prices, and the feasibility of ‘graduation’ after three to five years of participation</td>
<td>Remuneration calculated according to area covered so amounts are variable, work is often irregular and there are delays in payment (Sudarshan et al 2010). Some elite capture due to high wage rates which have distorted local labour markets (Imai 2007, Scandizzo et al 2009). Examples of mismanagement and corruption (Camfield and Vennam, 2012)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^7\) Of those who don’t work, four are studying in residential hostels during the week as they live in a remote tribal area, and one has a disability.

\(^8\) The equivalent figure for the whole sample ranged from 29-35 per cent, which may reflect a pro-poor bias in the qualitative sample – see also figures for PSNP/NREGS participation.
PSNP aims to reduce household vulnerability, especially food insecurity, increase resilience to shocks such as crop failure, and support movements out of poverty. Evaluations of the programme have reported mixed success (Devereux and Gunther, 2007; Hobson, 2009), particularly in relation to ‘graduation’ from the scheme as the amounts of money disbursed are small and have been depreciated by high food prices. NREGS aims to increase livelihood security, generate productive assets at the community and individual level, empower rural women, and reduce rural-urban migration. Where schemes are well-managed, NREGS has been successful in increasing livelihood security and women have been empowered in relation to wage negotiations as the amount paid by NREGS is more than double the rate for female agricultural workers. One of the distinctive features of NREGS is that participants work in groups, which means that slower or weaker individuals are not disadvantaged. However, the fact that these work groups are often caste or gender-based creates potentially discriminatory dynamics, for example, dangerous work being given to Scheduled Caste groups or single women struggling to find a group (Sainath, 2007). The physically demanding nature of the work in both schemes is less appealing to people who are older or have disabilities or health problems (Porter, 2010) and female household heads reportedly prefer daily labour as it can take up to one month to receive payment (Sudarshan et al. 2010). ‘Childcare’ is rarely provided in either scheme, even though this only refers to a designated worker supervising children on site (Jandu 2008, Sudarshan et al 2010, Berhane et al, 2011; Song, 2011). This may mean that women with young children do not participate, or more plausibly, given high female participation rates, that they take siblings out of school to care for babies at home or onsite, or leave babies with preschool children.

**Analytical methodology**
The descriptive statistics were generated using SPSS 18 and differences between girls from participating and non-participating households were tested using independent sample t-tests. The content of the translated interview transcripts was analysed using a simplified form of Spencer and Ritchie’s (1994) framework analysis, which involves i) reading and re-reading transcripts, noting key ideas and recurrent themes, ii) focusing on themes that relate to time use, intra-household division of labour, roles and responsibilities and PSNP or NREGS, iii) identifying and ‘charting’ portions of the data that correspond to a particular theme, and iv) looking at the nature/frequency of these across the sample and within the narratives of individual respondents. I also used a case study approach (Yin, 1994) to explore experiences of participation in PSNP and NREGS over time through the histories of particular children: ‘what actually happened in this specific instance as a result of context, path dependence, the actions and interactions of protagonists, and the mechanisms and processes at work and their consequences’ (Bevan, 2005:11). I used the summaries of the quantitative and qualitative data (table four, appendix) to select four cases which
show the impact of household participation in NREGS and PSNP on older girls’ lives (I have not focused these cases on girls directly participating in NREGS/PSNP as this represents less than 20 per cent of the qualitative sample9).

Results
In this section I use first the quantitative and then the qualitative data to look at the effects of PSNP and NREGS on girls’ lives. I focus initially on their workloads and participation in school and then use the qualitative data to set the schemes in the context of their lives as a whole, including household responses to ‘shocks’. 38 per cent of girls in the Ethiopian sample came from households that were registered in PSNP in the past year and 7 per cent were receiving direct support, without the requirement to work. A higher proportion of girls in the Indian sample came from households registered in NREGS (71 per cent) and 67 per cent of girls came from households that had worked for NREGS during the last twelve months10. In the past year 9 per cent of girls in the Ethiopian sample had missed school for more than one week. Girls from households who participated in PSNP were slightly less likely to have missed school, although this difference was not significant (6 per cent PSNP, 11 per cent non PSNP). A higher proportion of the Indian sample (20 per cent) had missed school for more than one week and girls from NREGS households were significantly more likely to have missed school (24 per cent, p=0.01). Children from NREGS households that have worked in the scheme during the past twelve months reported slightly lower grades (mean grade 9.6 vs. 9.9 for non-participants), but this just escapes significance (p=0.056). There were no significant differences in time use for girls from households working in NREGS and the only significant difference for girls from PSNP households was that they spent slightly less time in study and leisure (3.7 hours per day vs. 4.3 hours, p=<0.1) (table six).

Table 6: Differences in time use between girls from households who were or were not enrolled in PSNP or NREGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethiopia (n=271)</th>
<th>India (n=376)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean (hours per day)</td>
<td>Not enrolled in PSNP (n=168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid and farm work</td>
<td>1.1 (range 0-11)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chores and caring</td>
<td>4.8 (range 0-14)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total time</td>
<td>5.9 (range 0-6)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 I cannot confirm this figure in the whole sample because the girls are too young to be officially participating and so this is unlikely to be reported in a survey.
10 The reason why there are registered households who are not working is that some schemes are inactive and some households take job cards as a form of insurance.
Other studies suggest that the schemes have had mixed impacts on children’s lives (Emirie et al, 2009; Woldehanna, 2009; Hoddinott et al, 2009; Berhane et al, 2011; Camfield and Vennam, 2012) For example, Emirie et al (2009) and Berhane et al (2011:120) claim that while there is greater school enrolment, girls in PSNP households do domestic work while their parents are working on PSNP or are involved in other income-generating activities to cover the gap between PSNP income and consumption. This suggests that the impact of PSNP depends on the age and gender of the child and perhaps also whether credit from the Other Food Support Programme\(^\text{11}\) (OFSP) is used to purchase livestock that then need to be herded (Pankhurst, 2009). Further evidence for this comes from Hoddinott et al (2009) who reports that rural boys aged eleven and over benefit in terms of hours worked, but not girls. Woldehanna (2009) finds, contrary to my results, that PSNP increased girls’ time for studying, however, the girls were then aged 11-12 and expectations as to their workloads may have changed as they aged.

I now explore four case studies of adolescent girls from different types of household that are participating in PSNP and NREGS to look at its effect on their lives and specifically whether it reduces the impact of household shocks such as illness, which are identified as problems for girls in table two.

Triveni lives in Katur (Andhra Pradesh) with her grandmother and her elder sister who left school last year. She goes to the 'drought works' [NREGS] during the holidays using her grandmother's registration card with the permission of the meti [foreman]. She describes the work as moving boulders, constructing boundaries with mud, and digging ponds to store water for livestock. Carrying mud is difficult and heavy work - children carry as much mud in their baskets as adults - although her sister is skilful and never loses her burden. Triveni and her sister have to work on NREGS as her grandmother has been told she is too old. She enjoys the camaraderie of working in a group as if anyone falls ill people are willing to work extra to compensate for this. This contrasts with what she sees as a more individualistic attitude to daily labour where 'support is not given if someone falls behind as the one who supported may fall behind [also]'. Triveni and her sister give their money to their grandmother for everyday expenses and to buy clothes for them for festivals. The money has enabled them to repay more than Rs. 2,000 medical expenses from treating Chikungunya last year. It also makes a difference to their daily lives in small

\(^{11}\) OFSP is a credit and agricultural extension programme in which PSNP recipients are compelled to participate to facilitate graduation from the scheme.
but important ways: ‘Previously when there was less money, I used to buy fewer note books and used to adjust two subjects in one book only, madam. Now after the drought works came I am able to keep one book for each subject [...] Previously we were eating chutney [with rice], but now we make dahl’. Triveni reports small but valued improvements from participating in NREGS in relation to her health, diet, and access to school materials, even though she finds the work tiring.

Beletch (Leki, Ethiopia) does all the household chores - fetching water and wood, cooking, making coffee, baking bread, grinding maize, and going to market - as her aunt is sick and she is the only girl in the house (her parents and her sibling died when she was very young). After school she works on the vegetable farms digging holes and clearing earth to pay her school expenses. She works on PSNP on Sundays - her aunt and brother cover the remaining two days - and studies in the evenings. Beletch describes how on PSNP men, women and children work together according to their capacities: ‘when the men dig the holes, we fill in the erosion trenches with stones [...] they give us the works that we can work’. The PSNP activity she likes least is digging as everyone has to dig two to three feet, regardless of age. She also herds the cattle when there aren’t any younger children to do this and helps in her elder brother’s shop - ‘I work the whole day. My recess is only when I go for sleep’. Although she goes to school she can only study ‘after I finish house chores late in the evening’. Last year she dropped out due to illness and to repay a loan she took for her medical treatment because her caregivers couldn’t afford it. Beletch finds PSNP tiring, but no more so than the range of other paid and unpaid work she engages in, all of which reduces her time for study.

Tsega’s parents grow crops on a small plot around their house in Buna (Ethiopia) and her father has started doing construction work to compensate for repeated crop failure. Having left school last year to look after her sister she hasn’t been able to re-enrol: ‘this year my parents told me, after they bought [clothes and school materials] for the other children, that they didn’t have money to buy clothes and school materials for me, so I have to stop going to school’. She feels depressed by this as last year was her first year in her school, even though she was already fourteen. Tsega attributes the decision not to re-enrol her to shocks experienced the previous year (‘if the crop was not lost and the cow was alive, I would continue my schooling’). However, she also recalls her embarrassment at going to school without shoes, which suggests that material insecurity is a constant problem. She does not work on PSNP as her father and brothers cover the work requirement, but she herds the cattle bought through OFSP two mornings each week. PSNP has affected Tsega indirectly as its failure to offer adequate protection for the shocks her family experienced the previous year has delayed her entry into schooling and prevented her re-enrolling.

Haymanot’s father left when she was very young and she was sent away from Zeytuni (Ethiopia) to live with an aunt. Last year she left her aunt’s village, where
she had been attending school, to care for her mother who had developed a heart problem. She did not have time to re-enrol as she was doing all the chores and looking after her younger brother. She also worked in PSNP every day with her elder sister, weeded other people’s fields, and worked in the stone crusher. Although the household has land this is share-cropped out and they only receive a quarter of the yield. This year she has not returned to school and now works full-time in the stone crusher, nine hours per day, six days per week. The household is still in PSNP - her sister covers the work requirement – but she needs to continue working in the stone crusher as the payment for PSNP is irregular (every two to three months rather than every month). She finds working in the crusher tiring and frightening, due to the risk of injury (she had to take six days unpaid leave last week after crushing her finger). She also has little free time: ‘I would like to play with my friends but [...] I have only Sunday to get rest. I spend that day by washing my clothes, washing my body and fetching fuel wood’. PSNP also appears to offer little support to Haymanot who needs to work long hours in the stone crusher to cover their household expenditure, partly due to the irregularity of PSNP payments.

Taking the cases together we can see that Triveni is part of a ‘skip generation’ household: she and her sister meet everyday expenses, including school-related, by working in NREGS using their elderly grandmother’s card. They have also used NREGS to repay loans for medical treatment. Beletch, Tsega and Haymanot’s households also use PSNP for everyday expenses, although Haymanot and Tsega note that the payment is not sufficient to cover schooling. Triveni’s household found NREGS protective against shocks, however, PSNP has not protected Tsega’s household and the acquisition of cattle through OFSP has increased her workload. While it is not possible to draw generalised conclusions from such a small number of cases, these examples support insights from other studies of PSNP that the amounts earned are insufficient to protect against household shocks (Emirie et al, 2008). The requirement to participate in OFSP, usually by purchasing livestock, increases households’ risk and children’s workloads. This may partially account for the lower amount of time spent in study and leisure for girls from PSNP households (Pankhurst, 2009; Camfield and Roelen, 2012). Although similar criticisms have been made of NREGS in relation to the size of the payments (Sudarshan et al, 2010), in this case they compare favourably to the wages that a very young or old woman could have commanded in the local labour market prior to NREGS and can be more easily combined with schooling. Nonetheless, the quantitative analysis suggests that participation may affect girls’ school attendance and attainment and this should be explored further.

Discussion
The paper addresses the impact of social protection schemes, and to a lesser extent economic opportunities and shocks on the lives of adolescent girls in developing
countries, using the examples of PSNP and NREGS in Ethiopia and India. It concludes that in many cases these schemes increase girls’ workloads and significantly reduce their time for study and leisure, a finding supported by the literature review and shown to apply to CCTs. The increase relates to the invisibility of girls’ (and women’s) work and the gendered nature of social provisioning. Nonetheless, it would be unfair to single out social protection schemes in contexts where the majority of adolescent girls work for at least two hours per day, whether they attend school or not (five hours per day for female students in Ethiopia). Perhaps a more important failing of PSNP is its inability to protect against household shocks such as illness which leaves girls in Ethiopia acting as ‘shock absorbers’ for persistent crises12 (Fakier and Cock, 2009 in Locke et al 2012:12).

The schemes can also sharpen tensions between individual and family life courses, which reflect the embedding of girls in a ‘set of social activities’ that are shaped by ‘culture, ideology and social institutions’ (Power, 2004:7). Examples of this are where the costs of schooling for some siblings are covered, but not others (Tsega) or where increases in workload are reported for non-beneficiary children in households receiving conditional cash transfers (Barrero-Osorio et al, 2008). When older siblings migrated the burden of social provisioning often fell to a younger sibling (Haymanot), however, there are also examples of siblings sharing tasks (Tsega) or leaving school to support their younger sibling (Triveni), showing the diversity of motivations within the ‘other economy’.

The four case studies show a relationship between social protection schemes and social development outcomes, but perhaps not in the direction that was intended. Failures in social protection are increasing girls’ workloads which are affecting their school attendance, achievement, and in some cases health. These unintended consequences are the result of the ‘success’ as well as the failure of the schemes in that the poorest households are benefitting from additional income, even though in more remote areas this is at the expense of girls’ workloads. The paper highlights the need to ‘revalue social reproduction’ in social policy and planning (Locke et al, 2012) and recognize girls’ role in this, especially in responding to household shocks or when women are engaged in other activities. This paradigm shift can be accomplished through the lens of Donath’s (2000) ‘other economy’ which recognizes not only the ‘invisible work’ of adolescent girls, including the role they play in social provisioning, but also their embedding in sets of social relationships, which shape their motivations and constrain their agency. In the absence of a wider social policy orientation towards social reproduction and social protection, targeting schemes may ‘work’ somewhat perversely as they cannot compensate for the austerity of wider social policy during times of economic crisis and neoliberal government.

12 All of the three cases from Ethiopia dropped out of school due to their own or others’ illness – Haymanot and Tsega to look after their mother and sister and Beletch to repay a loan for medical care.
Consequently, they risk ‘improving’ the short-term lives of vulnerable families at the expense of girls’ schooling and workloads with medium and long term implications.

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References


http://www.righttofoodindia.org/data/navjyoti08_employment_guarantee_and_women's_empowerment.pdf


Table 1: Effect of social protection schemes on girls’ work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Reduces girls’ work</th>
<th>Increases girls’ work</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash transfer lottery, Ecuador</td>
<td>Edmonds and Schady, 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shift from paid work to domestic chores; total working hours decline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familias en Accion, Colombia</td>
<td>Attanasio et al, 2008 (reduced for peri-urban, no change for rural)</td>
<td>Barrero-Osoria et al 2008</td>
<td>Increase in work of female siblings of ‘treated’ children as households reallocate resources to favour child whose education is being monitored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Familia, Brazil</td>
<td>Ferro et al 2010 (reduces work of rural girls aged 6-10 and 11-15, but not older urban girls)</td>
<td>Cardoso and Souza, 2003 (Escola, no impact); Hall, 2008 (Familia, qualitative evidence that more mothers engaging in paid work/economic activities increased girls’ work)</td>
<td>Due to small size of the stipend children moved from work to work and school. Grants stimulated local economy, increasing female economic participation, which may have increased girls’ work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CESSP Scholarship Program, Cambodia</td>
<td>Ferreira et al, 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>Large reductions without ‘negative spillovers’ to siblings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programa de Asignación Familiar, Honduras</td>
<td>Gailiani and Macewan, 2011</td>
<td></td>
<td>Large reductions, especially in two poorest quintiles, without negative spillovers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red de protección, Nicaragua</td>
<td>Carpio, 2008</td>
<td>Carpio and Macours, 2009</td>
<td>In Carpio and Macours’ second analysis CCT income reduced the work of all groups, except older girls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingreso Ciudadano, Uruguay</td>
<td></td>
<td>Borraz-Gonzalez, 2009</td>
<td>Only reduced work of girls in the capital city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressa, Mexico</td>
<td>Rubino-Codina, 2009; Sadoulet et al, 2004; Skoufias and Parker, 2001 (reduced number of girls who worked by 10%, but didn’t reduce time spent working of girls who</td>
<td>Behrman et al, 2011; de Janvry et al, 2006 (protected against dropping out after shocks, but not against increasing work)</td>
<td>Rubino-Codina observed women substituting for children in domestic and farm work to free them for schooling, which was confirmed by Adato, 2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
continued to work)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Program</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Girls’ work decreased but only by 18% of the increase in enrolment, suggesting that enrolled children had little time for study, rest, or leisure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food for education, Bangladesh</td>
<td>Ravaillon and Wodon, 1999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSNP, Ethiopia</td>
<td>Hoddinott et al, 2009; Woldehanna, 2009; Emirie et al, 2010</td>
<td>Increases in work, particularly affecting girls, are attributed to direct and substitution effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGNREGS, India</td>
<td>Holmes and Jones, 2011; Camfield and Vennam, 2012; Martin, 2010</td>
<td>Increase in girls’ caring responsibilities, especially where childcare not provided, and some substitution for parents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I have excluded four studies on Ecuador, Peru, India and Nicaragua as they looked at paid work only (Schady and Araujo, 2006; Maluccio and Flores, 2005; Uppal, 2009), or just at whether the child worked or not (Perova and Vakis, 2009)
Table 2: Reasons for increases in girl’s work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main reason for increase in work</th>
<th>Locations</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change in types of household assets</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Cockburn and Dostie, 2007; Woldehanna et al, 2008; Heissler and Porter, 2010</td>
<td>e.g. acquisition of cattle that require herding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic opportunities, e.g. new enterprises, rising wages</td>
<td>Delhi, UP and Bihar, Kenya, South Asia, Peru, Malawi (micro-credit), Guatemala (micro-credit), Ethiopia</td>
<td>Basu, 1992; Self, 2011; Lokshin et al, 2000; Hazarika and Sarangi, 2008; Ilahi, 2001a; Katz, 1995; Skoufias, 1993; Woldehanna et al, 2008</td>
<td>Higher wages/ opportunities encourage women into labour market and increased income increase boys’ schooling but not girls, especially where there is no affordable childcare. Educated women in Ethiopia are more likely to have working daughters as their education means they can take advantage of new opportunities (Woldehanna et al, 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of affordable childcare</td>
<td>Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Ethiopia, Philippines, Kenya</td>
<td>Deutsch, 1998; Wong and Levine, 1992; Lokshin, 1999; Connelly et al, 1996; Cockburn and Dostie, 2007; Popkin, 1983; Lokshin et al 2000</td>
<td>Where there is no affordable childcare, presence of ‘mother substitutes’ (older children or other adults) is a key factor for women with pre-school children in deciding whether to undertake paid work (the impact on the recipients of care, e.g. under-nutrition, is described in Glick’s 2002 review)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National/ community level shocks, e.g. financial crisis, structural adjustment</td>
<td>Ecuador, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Yemen</td>
<td>Moser, 1992; Rodriguez, 1994; Hossain et al, 2010; Woldehanna et al, 2008 (drought, falling coffee prices)</td>
<td>Suggestive relationship between number of daughters and likelihood of women working in response to the crisis (Ecuador); reports of girls becoming sex workers (Yemen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illness</td>
<td>Indonesia, Peru</td>
<td>Pitt and Rosenweig, 1990; Ilahi, 1999, 2001b</td>
<td>Teenage girls increase time at home and reduce schooling and other activities when infants fall ill (Indonesia); “Girl children bear a greater time burden of sickness in the household than do boys” (Peru, Ilahi 1999:4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other shocks</td>
<td>Mexico, Ethiopia</td>
<td>Parker and Skoufias, 2006 (unemployment and divorce); Woldehanna et al, 2008 (bad debt)</td>
<td>Girls’ schooling is affected by these sorts of shock, boys’ schooling is not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger siblings</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Guatemala,</td>
<td>Cockburn and Dostie, 2007;</td>
<td>Gender (e.g. Ethiopia, South Africa) and spacing of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country/Region</td>
<td>Authors/References</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua, Nepal, Taiwan, South Africa, Andhra Pradesh, Philippines</td>
<td>Heissler and Porter, 2010; Dammert 2010; Edmonds, 2006; Fafchamps and Wahba, 2006; Chu et al 2006; Parish and Willis, 1993; Morduch, 2000; Ota and Moffat, 2007</td>
<td>Older girls are ‘sacrificed’ for later born children, although in the Philippines the eldest daughter is “most favoured” for schooling investments because they send remittances to fund younger children’s schooling (Estudillo et al)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of girl</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Mexico, Peru, Egypt, 16 developing countries</td>
<td>Alvi and Dendir, 2011; Levison et al, 2001; Ilahi, 1999; Assad et al, 2003; Levison and Moe, 1998; Webbink et al, 2012</td>
<td>Older girls more likely to work inside and outside home, regardless of gender, age or number of siblings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. Qualitative data on child work for the sample described in this paper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Child ID</th>
<th>NREGS or PSNP</th>
<th>Currently enrolled</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IN041029</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Doesn’t work or do housework (“I dice the vegetables. That’s all”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN041038</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mother only works on NREGS, she helps at home (studied at residential hostel for children from scheduled tribes until last year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN041045</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Studies at residential hostel and works on NREGS in holidays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN041046</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Studies at residential hostel, doesn’t work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN041047</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Studies at residential hostel, doesn’t work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN111021</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Migrates with her family for 6 months each year to work on roads in Bombay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN111027</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Works on NREGS and has earned Rs. 3,000 (gave Rs. 2,700 to parents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN111028</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Married 7 months ago, fetches water and cooks for husband’s household before working on the farm collecting groundnuts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triveni</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sister and grandmother do most of the work at home while she studies; she works in NREGS in the holidays on her grandmother’s card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN191010</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Married last year and is now pregnant – plans to resume school after the baby is born. Works at home, but as there only three people in household she spends most of the day watching TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN191014</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Doesn’t work as she wants to concentrate on schooling (she has a physical disability so her parents support her studying and she also has a scholarship). She was briefly bonded to cotton field owner to repay debt, but after 8 days she refused to continue and her younger sister took her place. Only father works on NREGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN191015</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Too young to work on NREGS so works on cotton fields and attends tailoring classes (left school last year as she regularly missed 3-4 months during pollination season)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Work</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN191029</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Misses school to replace her mother in the cotton field when her mother goes to sell vegetables at market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN191030</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Works on the cotton fields in holidays (used to work 2-3 months, but new variety of cotton requires less work and there are stricter controls on children’s labour)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET071010</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Does household chores only, assisted by siblings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET071016</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Cleans haricot beans after school (~4-5 hrs per day) and at weekends/holidays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET071030</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Cleans haricot beans after school (~4-5 hrs per day) and at weekends/holidays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET071032</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Works at home and herds cattle, doesn’t work on PSNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET081005</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Does all the household chores and looks after three siblings (her parents died seven years ago), works on irrigated vegetable farms (left school last year as couldn’t afford school materials), doesn’t work on PSNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET081011</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Does all the household chores after her sister married last year, works on irrigated vegetable farms and on PSNP at weekends (didn’t enrol in school this year due to illness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET081016</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Does most of the household chores due to her mother’s illness, works 3-4 days a week on irrigated vegetable farms, and attends school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beletch</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Works on PSNP and irrigated vegetable farms (prefers daily labour as more lucrative). Also works at home and attends school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET081035</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Does all the household chores as she is the only girl, looks after her mother when her father beats her, works on irrigated vegetable farms and attends school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET151024</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Household moved to town which reduced her workload at home, although she does all the chores when her mother goes away to trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET151025</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Helps her mother at home and works on family fields during harvest time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsega</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Works at home only; dropped out of school last year to look after her sister and didn’t re-enrol this year due to lack of money for school materials (father sent one of her siblings instead)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haymanot</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Dropped out of school last year to look after her mother and now works in stone crushers 9 hrs per day; hopes to re-enrol next year when she has saved money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET171005</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Does all the household chores and is supported to attend school by her elder brother who works as a labourer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET171010</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Shares household chores with her brother and sister, attends school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET171013</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Shares the household chores with her grandmother – her parents are dead and she has no siblings – and works in PSNP and stone crushing during the holidays</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>