My theme is an old-fashioned one; emancipation. In its roots, the Oxford English Dictionary tells us, it is, in Roman law, the action or process of setting children free from the patria potestas the parental jurisdiction. But this is mere nominal freeing unless it be supported by another definition the dictionary offers: delivering from intellectual, moral, or spiritual fetters. The essence of emancipation, as I conceive it, is the intellectual, moral and spiritual autonomy which we recognize when we eschew paternalism and the rule of authority and hold ourselves obliged to appeal to judgement. Emancipation rests not merely on the assertion of a right of the person to exercise intellectual, moral and spiritual judgement, but upon the passionate belief that the virtue of humanity is diminished in man when judgement is overruled by authority. That it is necessary in practice that personal judgement be so overruled by authority is testified by the universal existence of legal codes; but every overruling of judgement diminishes civilization; and the most civilised state is that in which the citizens are successfully trusted with the responsibility of judgement.

It is in this context that I want to recall the conception of humanism. And I am appealing to a rather widely recognized definition of that term. The Eleventh edition of Encyclopaedia Brittanica in 1910 described humanism in these terms:

Any system of thought or action which assigns a predominant interest to the affairs of men
as compared with the supernatural or the abstract. The terms is specially applied to that movement of thought which in western Europe in the fifteenth century broke through the mediaeval traditions of scholastic theology and philosophy and devoted itself to the rediscovery and direct study of the classics. This movement was essentially a revolt against intellectual, and especially ecclesiastical, authority and is the parent of all modern developments whether intellectual, scientific or social.

And the 1973 edition of the same encyclopaedia adds "As ecclesiastical influence waned, the protest of humanism was turned against secular orthodoxies that subordinated man to the abstract concepts of political or biological theory."

In its origins humanism was supported by a reinterpretation of the classical literatures of Greece and Rome.

Mediaeval Christianity, following mediaeval scholastic theology, asserted that man's life on earth had value and significance only in relation to the fate of his soul in a life after death. The law that governed the affairs of the living stemmed from a supernatural god and the question was whether this law was better interpreted by mystical intuition codified in the authority of the church or by the use of human reason, which, if it were functional, must have been created by God to lead man towards Him. Rationalists there were: Abelard, for instance. But the overwhelming authority was the law of the Church and rationalism itself was a logical analysis based on a theological metaphysics. A crucial problem was the nature of a trinitarian god. Issues of space and matter were expressed, not as four-dimensional theories, or as curved space, but as the problem of how many angels could stand on the point of a pin. In short there was little empirical study of any kind, and particularly of human affairs.
If Keats, who was supported by three hundred years of humanism, could encounter Homer in translation "Like some watcher of the skies when a new planet swims into his ken", we see how the classical world might impact upon those imprisoned in the assumptions of scholasticism. Take as simple an example as the first book of Plato's Republic: the enjoyment of the celebrations, the reflections on the satisfactions of prosperity in old age which is seen as the fulfilment of human experience, the literal sophistication of debate, and the whole held together by the personal influence of Socrates, surely the archetypal television don. I suppose that each of us here can recall in the past the excitement of some period of intellectual emancipation from the patria potestas which marks in our personal biographies a dawn in which it was "bliss to be alive". That must have been how it felt to be a member of the humanist discussion whose essence lay in the fact that it opened human affairs to the play of judgement rather than to the authoritative interpretation of an overriding divine law; and with the exercise of judgment the way was open for notions of responsibility or irresponsibility seen as criteria of the process, rather than of salvation or damnation as objective assessments of performance.

But the age was a religious one, as certainly as ours is secular. Salvation and damnation remained important, but for the Protestant there was no reassurance in the authority of the Church which could underwrite the responsible conscience of the individual, and it became possible to conceive it a social duty to attempt to strengthen the powers of every man and to balance them so that his capacity to doubt, to fear and to question might be satiated by his power to reason and to judge. Such was the conviction which underlay the development of popular education in those countries, generally Calvinist or Lutheran, in which the individual conscience was seen as the source of spiritual, and by an inevitable extension civil, judgement. It was the need to equip the citizenry to face this inescapable
responsibility which animated John Knox's proposal for an educational system in Scotland, for example. In the Lutheran tradition in particular the religious and the secular elements in this movement were intertwined. Thus the leaving examination for the almueskole, the Norwegian Vulgar school, was the confirmation examination in the Lutheran Church.

Of course, we are talking of aspirations, rather than perfect achievements. In education, and particularly in schooling rather than higher education, the problems of establishing a relationship across the generations between an adult, generally prone to the assertiveness which is tamed in most of us only by the exercise of self-discipline, and a cohesive group of recalcitrant young people, unwilling to postpone ribald satisfactions in the present for the doubtful prospect of future wisdom, have lead teachers to subordinate pupils by taking upon themselves the authority of knowledge, in defiance of the epistemology of the speculative humanism which I have been admiring. Yet it is arguable that the sharp authoritarian questioning which "kept them on their toes" gave at least some pupils in the Scottish schools the weapon to assert an autonomy, albeit a belligerent one.

There was however, another strand of humanism less democratic than Protestantism which found expression in the English rather than the Scottish educational system. This humanism rejoiced in man in society by emphasising style rather than reason as a vehicle of self-expression. The differing traditions of debate in the golden ages of the unions of the University of Glasgow and the University of Oxford catch the distinction rather well. It is, I think, this emphasis on style which has been, between the age of Disraeli, who himself embodied it, and the second World War, the main means and the main barrier to emancipation through education.
We are still two nations, because we produce through education a majority who are ruled by knowledge, not served by it, an intellectual, moral and spiritual proletariat, characterized by instrumental competencies rather than autonomous powers. I believe that no-one in the business of education should accept that situation as it is. If it is not to betray all that is most worthwhile in the European tradition, education must be centrally concerned with becoming the instrument of a redistribution of the means of autonomy and judgement. Yet the schools have become scholastic, conceiving knowledge as a matter of law rather than speculation, of assertion rather than enquiry, and of style.

It might be profitable to revisit humanism. The kind of humanism which "was essentially a revolt against intellectual and especially ecclesiastical authority and is the parent of all modern developments whether intellectual, scientific or social". But that humanism was essentially the humanism of an elite, because it fed upon the classics which were locked in the languages of ancient Greece and Rome. If we are to reinterpret humanism, then we must look towards a vernacular humanism, which, through the uses of languages domestically familiar to him, opens to the student a ready access to knowledge and that experience of its fruitfulness which Keats had from Homer through Chapman's intervention. An educational programme which would make realistic this aspiration is difficult to mount even under the most favourable conditions. It involves the formidable problem of expressing knowledge in those forms and activities which both invite and strengthen the judgement of the learner. Also it asks us to find an appropriate way to support, without constricting, people who are being weaned from the comforts of the authority of the patria potestas which asks only a cloistered virtue, to assume a more adventurous "personal responsibility frequently involving commitment: in the face of uncertainty".
That phrase is taken from the Schools Council Working Paper No. 2 on the raising of the school leaving age which was written by the late Derek Morrell and an H.M.I., John Witherington. I think it is fair to claim that both authors were steeped in the humanist tradition to which I have referred; and although there are in the working paper clear signs of the difficulty of breaking down the barriers of a humanism of the elite, it is nonetheless a remarkably imaginative and perceptive document.

Writing of the humanities in school, the authors have this to say:

But despite some slight awkwardness it is convenient to use the term 'humanities' to refer to that group of subjects which is predominantly concerned with men and women in relation to their environment, their communities and their own self knowledge. Within this area of the curriculum the teacher has a great deal of room for manoeuvre. It is also quite evident that the modern world cannot be understood without impinging on the field of economics, and that sociology, psychology and anthropology have a contribution to make to a teacher's armoury, even though these descriptions are unlikely to appear on the pupils' timetable.

But the main issues are, not so much what ground to cover in the sense of what subjects to teach, but what information ideas and experiences to grapple with, through what media, and by what means. The problem is to give every man some access to a complex cultural inheritance, some hold on his personal life and his relationships with the various communities to which he belongs, some extension of his understanding of, and sensitivity towards, other human beings. The aim is to forward understanding, discrimination and judgement in the human field - it will involve reliable factual knowledge, where this is appropriate, direct experience, imaginative experience, some appreciation of the dilemmas of the human condition, of the rough hewn nature of many of our institutions, and some rational thought about them.
I still find this a moving statement of an aspiration towards a humanistic education for all. And it is the text from which the Humanities Curriculum Project, of which I was formerly director, set out. In retrospect, I feel that the project might best have been called: "The problems and effects of teaching the humanities to adolescents". Of the problems working paper no. 2 had something to say. After its statement of aspiration the authors make this comment: "All of this may seem to some teachers like a programme for people who have both mental ability and maturity beyond the reach of most who will leave at the age of sixteen". And they comment that the Schools Council think it is important not to assume that this is so and urge that we should "probe by experiment in the classroom how far ordinary pupils can in fact be taken". The problem of making effective contact with the pupils as persons is noted, and it is suggested that, "if both teachers and pupils are to move towards more adult relationships, breaks in a previously settled routine will help". The Report faces the whole range of the curriculum in this spirit and goes on to review problems of school organisation and the pupil-teacher relationship where it notes that:

Adult procedures in the classroom...Will not be successful if a different kind of relationship between teacher and pupil obtains in the corridor or in extra-curricular activity. If the teacher emphasises, in the classroom, his common humanity with the pupils, and his common uncertainty in the face of many problems, the pupils will not take kindly to being demoted to the status of children in other relationships within the same institution.

In short the authors of the report saw the barrier to emancipation through education as lying in the relationship of the adolescent pupil to the authority of his teachers and of the institution of the school.
In our project we interpreted humanities as "human issues of universal concern" and our claim was that such issues were empirically controversial in the sense that parents, pupils, and teachers would disagree about them. Thus we were able to argue, by way of the school's responsibility to the parents and the pupils, that this was an area in which the teacher could not be an arbiter of truth or warranter of knowledge. Facing the problem of knowledge and control in this form, we argued that the relaxation in authority which was necessary for the emancipation of the pupils was in the teacher's claim to be an authority by virtue of his knowledge, and not in the teacher's claim to be in authority by virtue of the legitimation of his role. Perhaps I may remark in passing that in my view most teachers meet the adolescent challenge to authority by adapting the texture of the transmission of knowledge to make it a control mechanism at the expense of speculation and by using a claim to be an authority to escape the need for rational justification of their policies in authority. I sympathise with their problem and I believe it is difficult to escape from their position without making advances in the art of teaching.

It was to this task that the Humanities Project addressed itself when it evolved a pedagogy in which pupils were asked to consider evidence bearing on human issues under the chairmanship of a teacher who would exercise a procedural authority over the discussion without taking sides. The neutral chairman role is one in which the teacher attempts to embody into the procedures of learning fundamental educational values, while not obtruding his own substantive social, political or ethical values. The position is a complex one and the form of teaching is difficult to realize successfully against the background of the institutional pressure of a school whose overall climate is designed to support the comparative authoritarianism of instructional teaching.
I cannot profitably spend much time on an exposition of this project here and so I prefer to play a passage from a video-tape in which I see the budding of the vernacular humanism to which I am aspiring. The tape is an unusually successful one. It was made in a South Wales secondary modern school in an area where grammar schools took more than half the pupil population. In short, the pupils are just ordinary people. No claim is made that the tape is evaluative of the work in the project. This is an unusually successful example. I use it not to make promises but to define an aspiration.

This group is from an all boys junior comprehensive school, set in a suburban area of South Wales. Both the chairman and the students have one and a half years experience. There are fourteen boys in this mixed ability group of fifth years. They are discussing the nature and causes of poverty. This excerpt was recorded in a television studio:

Boy: No.
Teacher: Does poverty equal filthy conditions?
Boy: No sir, because that artist, he wasn't living in filthy conditions...
Boy: Only because he didn't have a house at all.
Boy: Well if he had a house, I don't think he'd be living in filthy conditions.
Boy: You can't tell, can you?
Boy: No, "cos he was happy, wasn't he?
Boy: We were talking a short while ago about um...a duke might consider himself...; if he was short of cash, couldn't buy something, he'd consider himself in a state of poverty, if he couldn't buy a castle or something.

Teacher: If he couldn't buy a Rolls Royce.
Boy: Yeah, if he couldn't buy something really expensive, which to his own mind, as compared to his standard of living would be a state of poverty, whereas compared to anyone else would just be a luxury. So there's probably differences of, you know, poverty, for different people at any rate...

Boy: In the lower class...well lower class, it's a...how shall I put it?

Boy: Poverty stricken people?

Boy: I can't say lower classes really, 'cos that'd be...

Teacher: Go on, we understand what you mean.

Boy: ...lower classes, big families usually meet with poverty, I've noticed that.

Boy: Perhaps it's not that big families lead to poverty, but they get poverty stricken because they've got so many children...

Boys: It's the same thing...

Boy: You could mean poverty leads to big families, they're in a state of poverty, the family, and then they have more kids so they get more money.

(Boys all speak together for 5 secs - indistinct)

Boy: ...They're not very intelligent you know...I want to press this point more I think, because surely a person who's poverty stricken who keeps having more children all the time, like this woman, she had six children, well, it's just ridiculous, isn't it?

Boy: It's more money...it's more money.

Teacher: Keith is suggesting that the poverty-stricken indulge in producing children as a source of income...(laughter)...that's what you said, isn't it? Is it true?

Boy: But they get the money to feed the children don't they?

(Boys all speak together for 10 secs - indistinct)

Boy: ...it's stupid saying they have children just to get more income.

Boy: I didn't say it as a fact, I just said it as perhaps a means by which....(inaudible)
Boy: The main scale is that the families with more than two children...and one child's under seven, they don't get so much for a child under seven. He's got to be seven before they get anything and that's still not enough for him.

Boy: You don't get anything for the second child I don't think...

Boy: The first child...

Teacher: The first child.

Boy: Well there was a chap along here with eleven children and he was out of work and they were managing pretty comfortably.

Boy: ...(indistinct)

Boy: Have you any knowledge of their financial conditions?

Boy: I've seen the children and I know they're not exactly running round in rags and at Christmas they get these toys, the same as any other children.

Boy: They might have a lot in the bank or something, you don't know.

Teacher: Is this an indication of the fact that poverty does not necessarily equate with squalor, that here's a family who was hard up, that could turn out very, very tidy children?

Boy: Yes,...(indistinct)...and because Will said that.

Boy: If you have a look at any family that lives in poverty, I would think that they would have over three children.

Boy: Why do you...why do you associate children with poverty?

Boy: Well, I don't know, that's just the common factor I see in all, you know, poverty stricken things...in any country.

Boy: What happens if they're ill, they don't have children...that's another one isn't it?

Boy: It's not as great as children, I don't think,

Boy: I think it is, just as great.

Boy: I think I see what Peter means because we discussed this in America, Texas or something, wasn't it? With that woman and she had children and she couldn't
afford to send them to the doctors and things like that. Wasn't it a piece of evidence we read... about that...we had a piece...a sheet of paper with a picture of...

Boy: About that town, where they all moved out...

Boy: Yes, where they all moved out and left...

Teacher: ...the fact the mine closed down.

Boys: Yeah, yeah, that's it.

Boy: That was in America, wasn't it?

Teacher: It was.

Boy: Yeah, that's right.

Boy: If we're going to solve this problem we've got to educate these people in contraceptives. This is about the only thing that I see we can do. And once you've cut down the children, you haven't got so many dependants upon the family, upon the working man himself. This is going to lighten his burden.

Boy: I would have thought they would have known about contraceptives.

Boy: Do you?

Boy: No, but I'm not a man am I?

(4 secs laughter)...I mean I'm not thinking of having children, am I?

Boy: Well I don't think you could have children yourself. Well come on then, look you're sixteen years old now, aren't you, you could get married tomorrow.

Boy: Yeah, but I'm not thinking of having children.

Boy: Well what are you going to do....(indistinct)

Teacher: What is the point Keith?

Boy: I don't know. I've forgotten now.

(4 secs laughter)

Teacher: It is a matter of education on contraceptives. Someone has suggested education generally, but is it just a matter of education, can education in anything solve this problem?
Boy: Well they are educated, aren't they?
Boy: In what way?
Boy: They are given education, but they don't take any notice of it.
Boy: They don't want to know.
Boy: No.
Boy: Well they haven't been educated have they?
Boy: Well they've had the opportunity.
Boy: Yes but they haven't been educated.
Boy: It's not our problem.
Boy: If they won't accept it. This is the point. How do they get people to accept education at all? I mean if they have been to school, you know, they've had a laugh right through school like, O.K., they are a bit older now but what's to say they are going to pay any notice if you push them back in school or try to teach them anything at all.
Boy: Yes, but most of them regret it afterwards, Keith.
Boy: No, I don't think they will. It's the standard of living. I don't think they think about these things, you know, they go to Bingo for the night or something like this. They would not want to go back to school.
Boy: You're talking now about women - we are talking about children.
Boy: I am talking about anybody they maybe go to the pubs or whatever they want to do but I don't think they want to learn.
Boy: No, they don't
Boy: We don't want to start pushing anybody back into school, anyway. They're not going to like it anyway.
Boy: Not into school. If you could have some sort of Centre or something...
Boy: Yes, but if you are going to say - "Oh you are not educated, get in there."
Boy: I don't think I would do it as crude as that.
Boy: No, but the meaning would get over to them.

Boy: It is not get in there - if you want help come to us.

Teacher: If a Centre were established just to what extent do you think it would be successful? A Centre, now, of a kind of intermediate Centre for the rehabilitation of slum dwellers.

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Let me compare the education offered by the Humanities Curriculum Project to that offered by the classics. There is, of course, an argument for the teaching of classics which rests upon the notion that intellectual problems are more easily soluble by a mind exercised in conjugations, declensions and syntactical constructions; but this is not the humanist argument. The humanist argument is that the ancient languages unlock an incomparable store of literature, history and philosophy, particularly suited, both by its freshness and by its position as a foundation of later western thinking, to provide the content of an education for the young. In the kind of discussion we have just seen I believe that we have a parallel yield to that expected of the classics and one accessible to the many rather than only to an elite. The vernacular form helps to overcome the linguistic barriers: the substitution of a reflective and co-operative discussion for one of dialectical conflict does much to overcome the barriers of style. There is enough in the work we have done in schools, I am claiming, to promise that a vernacular humanism could under the right conditions be made accessible to a very wide range of people. But when I make this claim I am doing no more than lay the foundations of a bridge on one side of the river. A vernacular tradition in popular education has implications for the frontiers of knowledge.
And so I want to argue the importance of a humanistic social science and a strong humanist tradition in the media of the arts today. For only these can provide adequate support for a humanist education.

There is a sense in which the eighteenth century age of enlightenment and reason was the final flowering of the classical humanist stock. There was a substantial minority public sufficiently familiar with the classics to support an elegantly allusive literature and this was a public at the same time responsive to many of the developments in philosophy, in history and in science. We were just at the beginning of that fruitful interaction between science and technical problems which enriched both the pure and the applied fields and made science a technical and specialised area of human activity. Fundamental to this progress was the capacity of science to deal in law-like generalisations which did not in principle allow of exceptions. Apparent exceptions must be explained in terms of the interactive effect of theoretical laws.

It is crucial that social science in its origins accepted the model of the physical sciences as the basis for a study of human affairs. The foundations of modern psychology lie in such an approach; and there are implicit elements of it in sociology and even in anthropology. The issue of whether physical events are inherently lawful is, of course, a matter of philosophical dispute. But it is clear that, whatever may be the case in principle, the assumption of lawfulness applied to human affairs leaves a substantial residual problem of explanation. This is signalled for example in the restrictions of behaviourism, which limits the range of data to be considered, and those of inferential statistics, which seeks to build probabilistic laws which by the device of probability admit of unexplained exceptions.
On such foundations rest approaches to social sciences which are non-humanistic in two senses. First, because they deal in probabilistic laws in which the irregularity and exceptions are not explained, they do not appeal to lay human judgement but incline to override it by quoting odds; and second the social sciences have produced a technical language whose referents do not coincide with lay observation and which does not therefore provide a medium for reflection about the experience of human affairs.

This tradition of social science has, I believe, run into considerable difficulties when it has been applied to fields of complex human action such as education, which is the area in which I myself am best informed. In an important and well-known address at the meeting of the American Psychological Association in 1974 Lee J. Cronbach, one of the leading figures in American psychology, discussed the limitations of a nomothetic, or law-seeking, approach to psychological research and observed:

Originally, the psychologist saw his role as the scientific observation of human behaviour. When hypothesis testing became paramount, observation was neglected, and even actively discouraged by editorial policies of journals.

And he concluded his speech:

Social scientists are rightly proud of the discipline we draw from the natural-science side of our ancestry. Scientific discipline is what we uniquely add to the time-honoured ways of studying man. Too narrow an identification with science, however, has fixed our eyes upon an inappropriate goal. The goal of our work, I have argued here, is not to amass generalisations atop which a theoretical tower can some day be erected. The special task of the social scientist in each generation is to pin down the contemporary facts. Beyond that, he shares with the humanistic scholar and the artist in the effort to gain insight into contemporary relationships, and to realign the cultures view of man with present realities. To know man as he is is no mean aspiration.
In this formulation I feel that there is still the implication that there is an objective facticity about man as he is which is to be pinned down in the sense of reduced to terms different from those sulied by the experience of living. In effect, the truth about man is conceived as an abstracted truth.

In terms of methodology this abstraction begins in the ideas of comparability and sampling. The idea of comparability implies that the data about man must be organized in comparable, and, if possible, quantifiable, units. The categories used must be carefully defined so that they are unambiguous in denotation. The observations of different observers must yield the same results. They must be amenable at least to being tallied, at best to being scaled.

This demand that data should be gathered in a way that makes them comparable without the need for fine judgement immediately implies an abstraction so radical as to remove the data from the world of, and hence from the judgement of, experience. Operations performed on these data are not accessible to criticism in the light of experience. They elude capture by wisdom, though they are rationally manipulable. They must be processed within an inviolable logic of their own and the results then related once more to the business of living from which the data were originally abstracted.

Moreover, such data are treated as attributes of populations in the sense that relatively small samples of living reality can be drawn which are to be judged representative of a population of comparable living realities. On this argument an experimental and a control group can be compared as if they were the same; and the results of that comparison can be generalized according to a calculated probability to a target population, related to the samples by virtue of definition and not by virtue of judgement.
The humanistic alternative, or, to be modest, complement, to such a positivist approach to the study of human affairs, is a social science which is a contemporary history. History is concerned not with data which is comparable but with evidence it will undertake critically to compare. And it accepts evidence not only about behaviour, but also about experience. The historian works with sources as diverse as records of parliamentary debates, legislative statutes, newspapers, diaries, letters, photographs, pictures, even music and now cinema and recordings. He compares and relates them by an exercise of critical appraisal and he presents his conclusions to us, not as results which we are to accept on the grounds of an impeccable research technique, but as accounts of life which we are to judge in the light of our own experience, tutored by the broader experience to which we have had access through the arts - including history.

Such a social discipline studies cases, not samples, and studies them with proper attention to their richness and ambiguity. Its basis is a comparative procedure which takes comparability as problematic, and which accepts that the relevance of any study of man in society depends not on the formulation of abstracted laws, but rather upon the situational judgement of the living men to whom the study is addressed. It emphasises application, rather than generalization, and hence it must aspire to strengthen, and never to override, the judgement of those it addresses.

I see the buds of such a contemporary historical study in social science, and I believe that it is important not only that it should be developed by students but more especially that its logic should be so disseminated to the public that there is a rejection of the formulation "scientists tell us that......"; and an acceptance of the right and the responsibility to judge.
This necessary underpinning of a vernacular humanism needs to be supplemented by an accessible tradition of thought in the arts. By the device of fiction - an absolution from the demands of authentication - the arts acquire a licence to explore truths inaccessible to even a humanistic social science or social history. They can address and ask confirmation from the secret experience of life which, they reassure us, can be breached by a felicitous and penetrating communication.

I spoke earlier of a vernacular humanism as one which addresses people in "languages which are domestically familiar". I had in mind a comparison of the family circles of Thomas More or John Stuart Mill which domesticated the intellectual tradition of an elite, and those of ordinary people today.

It is apparent, therefore, that I would respond positively to the importance claimed for television by such a representative of that medium as Denis Potter. But all the arts stand at television's shoulder with a capacity to be popular arts. What is demanded of popular art - in television, pop music, novels, paintings and happenings of every kind - if it is to support a vernacular humanism, is that it have a sufficiently strong central strand of integrity and engagement. The enemy of this is not the complementary art of escapism, which must certainly have its place, but an art which creates an unreal world authoritatively related to the real world. This is an art which disseminates generalization through stereotypes, which invites us to accept rather than to question the surface of experience. What is needed is an art created by artists who claim to be like us in their humanity, who insistently disclaim the authority of glamourisation and the reification of the looking-glass world of being flown-in from a more compelling reality which is where it all happens.
What chance there is of developing within education a vernacular humanism such as I have described and of feeding it upon a humanistic social study and a humanistic art I leave it to this conference to speculate. No doubt it all sounds an idealistic aspiration. But I shall offer one dogmatic proposition by which I am prepared to stand: the contemporary human condition is never the product of success, always by contrast the outcome of those aspirations men have thought it worth falling short of.