

7 Evaluation and the control of education

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Evaluators rarely see themselves as political figures, yet their work can be regarded as inherently political, and its varying styles and methods as expressing differing attitudes to the power distribution in education. The evaluator differs from the researcher in that he neither chooses nor controls the enterprise he has to study; his task is not to select questions his instruments can answer, but to find ways of solving questions to which others need answers. He must identify those various, often conflicting groups who make educational decisions and give them the information they feel to be valuable. In choosing his allegiances and priorities, the evaluator necessarily commits himself to a political stance. This chapter offers a political classification of evaluation studies, and ends by considering the contemporary context of such work.

INTRODUCTION

Evaluators seldom if ever talk about themselves as political figures, persons involved in the distribution and exercise of power. To do so would verge on bad taste. Do we not share, with those who teach and those who research and those who administer, a common commitment to the betterment of the educational system we all serve? Let the journalists monitor the tilting balance of control, or talk of 'secret gardens'.^{*} We have a job to do, a technology to perfect, a service to render. Political language is rhetorical or divisive, when it is not both. It is a dangerous discourse for evaluators to engage in.

It is therefore with some trepidation that I address myself to the political dimension of evaluation studies. That I should do so at all is not, as some readers might surmise, because all the legitimate facets of evaluation have been

^{*} The phrase 'the secret garden of the curriculum' was coined in 1960 by the then Minister of Education, Sir David Eccles, in the parliamentary debate on the Crowther Report (Central Advisory Council for Education (England), 1959-60). It was a sardonic acknowledgement of the extent to which control of educational policy lay outside national government. The phrase has since become popular with educational journalists.

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Book
David Tawny's
"Exhibition" ?

fully explored in the previous chapters, thus driving me to speculative invention. Rather, it is because I have increasingly come to view evaluation itself as a political activity, and to understand its variety of styles and approaches as expressions of differing stances towards the prevailing distribution of educational power. I intend to propose a simple classification system for evaluation studies. My trepidation will be readily appreciated when I say that the terms I propose to employ are three words which are familiar enough in political discussion, but generally excluded from the vocabulary of dispassionate description: 'bureaucratic', 'autocratic' and 'democratic'. Although it may not be immediately apparent that these are useful words to employ in an interpretative description of evaluation studies, I suggest that we attempt the analysis and see to what extent we feel comfortable with the perspective it generates. Our task is to relate the style of an evaluation study to the political stance it implicitly adopts. The analysis is not intended to be divisive, but to encourage wider reflection on the alternative roles available.

I am aware that only the academic theorist uses these political terms referentially: most of us employ them when we wish to combine a definition of an action or structure with the expression of an attitude towards it. 'Bureaucracy' and 'autocracy' carry overtones of disapproval, while 'democracy'—at least in western societies—can still be relied upon to evoke general approval. Nor am I free from such affective responses myself, and it will not escape the reader that my own stance falls conveniently under the 'democratic' label. Nevertheless, my major argument is not directed against what I shall call bureaucratic and autocratic evaluation stances, but towards the need to make explicit the political orientation of the evaluator, so that we can define the kinds of evaluation study that we want and need. And it may be worth while reminding the reader that we belong to a society which aspires to a form of democracy in which a highly developed bureaucracy is reconciled with individual freedom of action.

Let me begin by giving a historical account of some of the considerations which led me to formulate such a typology. Four occasions stand out in mind. The first was a few years ago, during a visit to the United States. I met a research worker who had recently completed an evaluation of the effects of a particular State school 'bussing' programme. She was in a mood of deep gloom. 'What's the point of educational research?' she said. It turned out that the evaluation report, commissioned by the State authority for a review of its bussing policy, was then ignored when the review took place. The evaluation strongly endorsed the educational value of the prevailing policy, but the decision was to discontinue bussing. The evaluation report was confidential to its sponsors.

I cannot recall how I responded at the time, but now I would say that it was a good piece of educational research but a bad piece of evaluation. Bad for two reasons: first, because it paid insufficient attention to the context of

the policy decision it sought to serve and, secondly, because it allowed the conditions of contract to pre-empt the right of those affected to be informed.

A couple of weeks afterwards, I had a brief conversation with one of the most respected exponents of educational evaluation in America, whose views I sought on this issue. He was extremely scathing about the service role adopted by evaluators. A 'cop-out' was what he called it, implying that my new-found profession was little more than the hired help of the bureaucracy. As a Schools Council project evaluator, I found this at the time rather difficult to relate to my own situation. No one, except my mother-in-law and a few well-meaning friends, had told me how to do my job or placed other than financial restrictions on me. I asked this man to tell me how he envisaged the responsibility of evaluation—indeed, how he exercised it, since he was, and still is, a very powerful practitioner. 'It is the duty of the evaluator', he told me, 'to reach a conclusion about the comparative merits of alternative courses of educational action. It is also his duty', he added, 'to ensure that his judgement is implemented by those who control the allocation of resources.'

Taken aback by this remarkably interventionist conception of evaluation, I asked my informant how he could justify such a stance. The answer was twofold. An evaluator's judgement is based on objective evidence of accomplishment—evidence gathered by means of a technology of public procedures and skills. The whole process of conclusion-reaching is guaranteed by the evaluator's peer group, the research community. Muscling in on policy decisions, on the other hand, can be justified by an appeal to democratic principles enshrined in the constitution—principles which the bureaucracy cannot be trusted always to uphold.

I did not find this argument attractive. The 'evaluator king' role appealed to me even less than the role of the 'hired hack'. It seemed to me that the act of evaluation is not value-free. Also, the technology is alarmingly defective, and the whole process of conclusion-reaching far from transparent. What is more, although the research community might be notionally construed as custodian of the scientific detachment of its members, and guarantor of the validity of their conclusions, in fact such a function is only systematically carried out in relation to academic awards. Indeed, the community has shown few signs of any desire to extend that jurisdiction. Perhaps it is just as well. When research is closely related to ideology, as is the case with educational research, history suggests that we lock up the silver.

My third conversation took place more than two years ago, at a gathering of evaluators at Cambridge. This time I can name the other party, something I could not do in the first two instances because I am unsure about the detailed accuracy of my recall, and because it would be wrong to turn casual remarks into enduring statements. We were discussing the role of the evaluator in relation to educational decision-making when Myron Atkin, of the University of Illinois, spelled out what he saw to be a dangerous trend in

America, a growing attempt on the part of the research community to use its authority and prestige to interfere in the political process. It was no part of the researcher's right, *qua* researcher, to usurp the functions of elected office-holders in a democratic society.

I realize that anyone reading this who has a part-time job of evaluating, say, the effect of certain reading materials on children's oral vocabulary in a primary school in Anytown may think this anecdote extremely peripheral to his concerns. I would argue that the underlying issue is one which no evaluator can dismiss and, furthermore, that the resolution of the issue is a major factor in determining his choice of evaluation techniques.

But first my fourth anecdote, involving yet another American. No apology will be called for on that account, I hope, although I anticipate having to resist charges of incipient elitism. We in Britain are fledgelings in a specialism that is well established across the Atlantic. Robert Stake was addressing a meeting of the Schools Council evaluators' group at a time of high electoral fever. The then Prime Minister, Edward Heath, had declared the key election issue to be 'Who rules Britain?' and Stake began his presentation by suggesting that an important issue for evaluators was 'Who rules education?' Relating this question to the accountability movement in America (see also below, p. 134), he argued a strong case for recognizing the informational needs of different groups affected by curriculum decisions (see Stake, 1974).

The phrase 'Who rules education?' stuck in my mind, and began to interact with other questions and concerns, including those already mentioned. At that time I had written a couple of things myself that were relevant, and I hope the reader will forgive me for quoting from them. The first was a proposal advocating the funding of an evaluation of computer assisted learning:*

The everyday meaning of the word 'evaluate' is unambiguous. It means quite simply to judge the worth of something. This is a long-established usage, and it is hardly surprising that many people assume that the task of the educational evaluator is to judge the worth of educational programmes. Some evaluators do in fact share this assumption, and a few would even argue that the evaluator has a right to expect that his judgements be suitably reflected in subsequent policy. But there are others, including the present writer, who believe that the proper locus of judgements of worth, and the responsibility for taking them into account in the determination of educational policy, lie elsewhere. In a society such as ours, educational power and accountability are widely dispersed, and situational diversity is a significant factor in educational action. It is also quite clear that our society contains groups and individuals who entertain different, even conflicting, notions of what constitutes educational excellence. The

* 'Educational evaluation of the National Development Programme in Computer Assisted Learning', p. 1. Proposal to the Programme Committee of the National Development Programme, 7 November 1973. The views expressed in the passage quoted are my own. (The proposal appears as Appendix A in *The Programme at Two* (CARE, University of East Anglia, 1975).)

evaluator has therefore many audiences who will bring a variety of perspectives, concerns and values to bear upon his presentations. In a pluralist society, he has no right to use his position to promote his personal values, or to choose which particular educational ideologies he shall regard as legitimate. His job is to identify those who will have to make judgements and decisions about the programme, and to lay before them those facts of the case that are recognised by them as relevant to their concerns.

It did not occur to me when I wrote it that this is an essentially political statement, involving an acknowledgement of the distribution of power and values, an affirmation of a decision-making process, and an assertion of the evaluator's obligation to democratize his knowledge. The second piece I had written introduced a section in a book of readings in curriculum evaluation (Hamilton et al., eds, 1976). The section was concerned to illustrate the 'objectives' model of evaluation and its development from the early papers of Ralph Tyler to current applications in America and Britain. Getting the section ready, I was puzzled still by the difficulty in explaining why this approach to curriculum planning, so popular for so long in America, had really failed to take root in our own country, despite the elegance of its logic and the absence of alternative models. Then it suddenly struck me that the model could be viewed as a cultural artifact, as American as popcorn. It was an ideological model harnessed to a political vision. I wrote:

The inclination of so many American curriculum developers and evaluators to perceive educational change as a technological problem of product specification and manufacture, is by itself unremarkable. Mechanistic analogies have a peculiar appeal for a people who see themselves as the raw materials of a vision which can be socially engineered. Their culture is characteristically forward-looking, constructionist, optimistic and rational. Both the vision and the optimism are reflected in the assumption that goal consensus, a prerequisite of engineering, is a matter of clarification rather than reconciliation. In contrast British culture is nostalgic, conservationist, complacent and distrustful of rationality. Our schools are the agents of continuity, providing discriminating transmission of a culture that has stood the test of time and will continue to do so, given due attention to points of adaptive growth. Goal consensus is neither ardently desired, nor determinedly pursued. Such pursuit would entail a confrontation of value-systems which have so far been contained within an all-embracing rhetoric of generalized educational aims. . . .

The theory and practice of the objectives model of evaluation is thus wedded to an American view of society, and an American faith in technology. Pluralist societies will find it difficult to use. Unified societies will use it, and discover they are pluralist.

Having now aired a number of questions related to the uses and abuses of evaluation from a politico-ideological perspective, I want, before drawing them together, to remind the reader of some crucial distinctions between evaluation and research.

EVALUATION AND RESEARCH

It is possible to emphasize, as Nisbet (1974) did most lucidly at the inaugural meeting of the British Educational Research Association, that curriculum evaluation is an extension of educational research, sharing its roots, using its methods and skills. It was salutary, too, as Nisbet understood, to remind us of the dangers of engaging in our own internecine territorial power games. While I have no wish to quarrel with the assertion of many commonalities shared by evaluation and research, it is important for my present purpose to emphasize one major distinction, and a particular danger in subscribing too readily to the continuity thesis.

The distinction is one to which Hemphill (1969, p. 190) draws attention in a paper on this theme. After stating that the basic and utilitarian purpose of evaluation studies is to provide information for choice among alternatives, and that the choice is a subsequent activity not engaged in by the evaluators, he says:

This fact might lead to the conclusion that an evaluation study could avoid questions of value and utility leaving them to the decision-maker, and thus not need to be distinguished from research, either basic or applied. The crux of the issue, however, is not *who* makes a decision about what alternatives or *what information* serves as the basis for a decision; rather, it is the *degree to which concern with value questions is part and parcel of the study.*

A matter of 'degree' may not suggest a worthwhile distinction. It is necessary to be more explicit. Of course, values enter into research, in a number of ways. There are many people in Britain who have resisted the conclusions of a great deal of educational research since the war, on the grounds of value bias inherent in problem selection and definition. This was notable in the response to research into educational opportunity, and seems likely to characterize the reception of current research in the field of multi-ethnic education. Other value judgements of the researcher are less perceptible and lie buried in his technology. The more esoteric the technology, the less likely are these values to be detected. Test and survey instruments are wrongly assumed to be value-free because of the depersonalized procedures of administration and analysis that govern their application. There is more value bias in research than is commonly recognized. Nevertheless, it remains the responsibility of the researcher to select the problem and devise the means, a responsibility safeguarded by the totem of 'academic freedom'. He construes his task in these terms: 'Which of the questions I judge to be important can I answer with my technology?'

The position of the evaluator is quite distinct, and much more complex. The enterprise he is called upon to study is neither of his choosing nor under his control. He soon discovers, if he has failed to assume it, that his script of

educational issues, actions and consequences is being acted out in a socio-political street theatre which affects not just the performance, but the play itself. He finds he can make few assumptions about what has happened, what is happening, or what is going to happen. He is faced with competing interest groups, with divergent definitions of the situation and conflicting informational needs. If he has accepted narrowly stipulative terms of reference, he may find that his options have been pre-empted by contractual restraints that are subsequently difficult to justify. If, on the other hand, he has freedom of action, he faces acute problems. He has to decide which decision-makers he will serve, what information will be of most use, when it is needed and how it can be obtained. I am suggesting that the resolution of these issues commits the evaluator to a political stance, an attitude to the government of education. No such commitment is required of the researcher. He stands outside the political process, and values his detachment from it. For him the production of new knowledge and the social use of that knowledge are rigorously separated. The evaluator is embroiled in the action, built into a political process which concerns the distribution of power, i.e. the allocation of resources and the determination of goals, roles and tasks. And it is naïve to think of educational change as a game in which everybody wins, seductive though that is. One man's bandwagon is another man's hearsay.

When evaluation data influence power relationships, the evaluator is compelled to weigh carefully the consequences of his task specification. The much-used term 'independent evaluator' obscures rather than clarifies the problem. Independent of whom? The people who fund the evaluation? The curriculum development team? The pupils, parents, teachers, LEAs, publishers, critics? His own values and needs? The independent evaluator is free only to choose his allegiance, to decide whom he shall listen to, whose questions will be pursued, whose priorities shall have primacy, who has the right to know what. In this sense, the degree of his involvement with values is so much greater than that of the researcher that it amounts to a difference in kind. It also makes explicit the political dimension of evaluation studies.

I said earlier that there was a danger in subscribing too readily to the continuity thesis. It is this. The researcher is free to select his questions, and to seek answers to them. He will naturally select questions which are susceptible to the problem-solving techniques of his craft. In a sense, as Hastings (1969) has pointed out, he uses his instruments to define his problems. The evaluator, on the other hand, must never fall into the error of answering questions which no one but he is asking. He must first identify the significant questions, and only then address the technological problems which they raise. To limit his inquiries to those which satisfy the critical canons of conventional research is to run a serious risk of failing to match the 'vocabulary of action' of the decision-maker, as House has described it (1972, p. 135). The danger, therefore, of conceptualizing evaluation as a branch of research is that evaluators become

trapped in the restrictive tentacles of research respectability. Purity may be substituted for utility, trivial proofs for clumsy attempts to grasp complex significance. How much more productive it would be to define research as a branch of evaluation—a branch whose task it is to solve the technological problems encountered by the evaluator.

The relevance of this issue to my present thesis is easy to demonstrate. The political stance of the evaluator has consequences for his choice of techniques for information-gathering and analysis. Recently, I bumped into a researcher whose completed report was being considered for publication at the Schools Council. He was somewhat impatient over a criticism that had been made. 'Some of these people at the Council', he observed caustically, 'seem to think that everything one writes should be understandable to teachers.' This raises the issue nicely. A great deal of new knowledge is produced by researchers and evaluators using techniques and procedures which are difficult to understand. Conclusions are reached and judgements made by the few who are qualified to make them. Others accept or reject these conclusions according to the degree of respect they feel towards those who make them, or the degree to which the conclusions coincide with their beliefs and self-interest.

For many years now, those concerned with the failure of the educational system to make full use of the results of educational research have pleaded for all teachers to be trained in the techniques of research. Perhaps some of that effort should have been expended in exploring techniques that more closely resemble the ways in which teachers normally make judgements—techniques that are more accessible to non-specialist decision-makers. The evaluator who sees his task as feeding the judgement of a range of non-specialist audiences faces the problem of devising such techniques, the problem of trying to respond to the ways of knowing that his audiences use. Such an effort is at present hampered by the subjection of evaluators to a research critique divorced from considerations of socio-political consequences.

A POLITICAL CLASSIFICATION OF EVALUATION STUDIES

Evaluators not only live in the real world of educational politics; they actually influence its changing power relationships. Their work produces information which functions as a resource for the promotion of particular interests and values. Evaluators are committed to a political stance because they must choose between competing claims for this resource. The selection of roles, goals, audiences, issues and techniques by evaluators provides clues to their political allegiance.

It would be useful at this point to describe the three distinct types of evaluation study—bureaucratic, autocratic and democratic. In doing so, I am using the familiar device of ideal typology, that is, describing each type in pure form. When one compares real examples with the ideal, there is rarely a per-

ough frequently an approximation can be found. My analysis of an attempt to present them equally, to characterize accurately features. It would be ironic, however, if I failed to acknowledge impered in this effort by a personal preference for the 'democratic' to recognize that an analysis which precedes an argument is ct. The field of evaluation has been characterized by studies to one or other of the first two types. The democratic evaluation emerging model, not yet substantially realized, but one which ne recent theoretical and practical trends. It is, in part, a reaction nance of the bureaucratic and autocratic types of study currently th American programmes.

evaluation

evaluation is an unconditional service to those government h have major control over the allocation of educational resources. r accepts the values of those who hold office, and offers informa- ill help them to accomplish their policy objectives. He acts as a consultant, and his criterion of success is client satisfaction. es of study must be credible to the policy-makers and not lay public criticism. He has no independence, no control over the ade of his information, and no court of appeal. The report is e bureaucracy and lodged in its files. The key concepts of valuation are 'service', 'utility' and 'efficiency'. Its key justi- pt is 'the reality of power'.

evaluation

evaluation is a conditional service to those government agencies major control over the allocation of educational resources. It offers dation of policy in exchange for compliance with its recom- Its values are derived from the evaluator's perception of the d and moral obligation of the bureaucracy. He focuses upon educational merit, and acts as expert adviser. His techniques of study scientific proofs, because his power base is the academic research His contractual arrangements guarantee non-interference by the e retains ownership of the study. His report is lodged in the files acracy, but is also published in academic journals. If his recom- are rejected, policy is not validated. His court of appeal is the munity, and high levels in the bureaucracy. The key concepts of e evaluator are 'principle' and 'objectivity'. His key justificatory e responsibility of office'.

*Democratic evaluation**

Democratic evaluation is an information service to the whole community about the characteristics of an educational programme. Sponsorship of the evaluation study does not in itself confer a special claim upon this service. The democratic evaluator recognizes value pluralism and seeks to represent a range of interests in his issue formulation. The basic value is an informed citizenry, and the evaluator acts as broker in exchanges of information between groups who want knowledge of each other. His techniques of data-gathering and presentation must be accessible to non-specialist audiences. His main activity is the collection of definitions of, and reactions to, the programme. He offers confidentiality to informants and gives them control over his use of the information they provide. The report is non-recommendatory, and the evaluator has no concept of information misuse. He engages in periodic negotiation of his relationships with sponsors and programme participants. The criterion of success is the range of audiences served. The report aspires to 'best-seller' status. The key concepts of democratic evaluation are 'confidentiality', 'negotiation' and 'accessibility'. The key justificatory concept is 'the right to know'.

THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT OF EVALUATION STUDIES

What progress can be made towards the task of comparing these ideal types with manifestations in the real world? It is important to avoid the dangers of labelling and stick to the notion of comparison. To judge by the sudden rash of accountability legislation in the United States, bureaucratic evaluation has American education by the throat, and is tightening its grip. Although it would be an exaggeration to suggest that the long tradition of local control of schools has been seriously undermined, we cannot lightly dismiss the fact that in 1973 thirteen States enacted legislation tying teacher tenure and dismissal to the achievement of performance-based objectives, pre-determined by administrators and assessed by evaluators. Strenuous opposition from teacher unions to this mechanistic over-simplification of complex problems is falling to the argument that soaring educational costs demand proof of payoff. Some observers suspect ulterior motives. House (1973, p. 2) writes: 'I believe such schemes are simplistic, unworkable, contrary to empirical findings, and ultimately immoral. They are likely to lead to suspicion, acrimony, inflexibility, cheating, and finally control—which I believe is their real purpose.' If he is correct in this interpretation, and it is at least plausible, then the lack of a professional ethic for evaluators is exposed. This is 'hired help' with a vengeance, and it gives a wry twist to the Stufflebeam and Guba definition of the

* This approach to evaluation is currently guiding field work in the Ford SAFARI Project, which is developing a case-study method of educational inquiry. I am indebted to my colleague Rob Walker, who shares with me responsibility for this conceptualization.

purpose of evaluation—'aiding and abetting the decision-makers' (1968).

The logic of the accountability movement bears a family resemblance to the engineering paradigm of evaluation pioneered by Tyler and accorded powerful legitimation by the federal bureaucracy in monitoring its massive investment in curriculum development over the past decade, even though the potential of evaluation studies as instruments of control was noted. Cohen (1970, p. 219) writes:

... the Congress is typically of two minds on the matter of program evaluation in education—it subscribes to efficiency, but it does not believe in Federal control of the schools. National evaluations are regarded as a major step toward Federal control by many people, including some members of Congress.

It is also possible to see evidence of autocratic trends in the American evaluation scene. Federal allocation of educational expenditure has always tended to be more sensitive to the need for external validation than policy at the State level, and the expensive national programmes of recent years have seen the rise to powerful advisory positions of evaluators such as Michael Scriyen. 'Blue ribbon' panels of evaluation experts are called upon by federal bureaux to decide which of two or more existing programmes should continue to receive support. In this way the bureaucracy controls expenditure and deflects criticism on to the academic 'autocrat'.

What of the democratic model? Some of its central ideas can be detected in the views currently advanced by Stake (1974). Evaluation studies which embody his recognition of value pluralism and multiple audiences will meet some of the criteria of democratic evaluation which I characterized earlier.

Turning to the United Kingdom, the contemporary scene is, in one sense at least, much simpler. If we agree to regard evaluation as distinct from research, then relatively few evaluation studies have been carried out, and only a handful of people would categorize their profession as educational evaluation. Most evaluations have been one-off jobs done by people without prior or subsequent experience, usually teachers on secondment to curriculum projects. We have no evaluation experts. Investment in evaluation studies is marginal at the national level, and almost non-existent at the local level. But that situation could change rapidly. There is concern here too with the rising level of educational expenditure, together with recognition of the need for schools to respond effectively to changing social and economic conditions. These are the conditions of growth for evaluation, which could have a significant role to play in the next decade. What influence will evaluators exert on the changing pattern of control?

The control of education in the United Kingdom has been for half a century vested in a delicately balanced tripartite system, with power shared between central government, local government and teachers. The composition and terms of reference of the Schools Council maintain this balance carefully

enough to reflect the strength of the ideal or the zealotry with which the partners guard their share of control. Despite its relatively small budget and its limited powers, the Council is regarded with some suspicion by those who fear bids for more control of education by national government. The Council came into being as a result of teacher reaction to ministry initiatives, and it is located in London, originally within a stone's throw of the Department of Education and Science. Stones have been known to carry instructions! Others argue that the Council is more vulnerable to control by the teacher unions, by virtue of their superior representation. It could become a practitioner bureaucracy. The Council is a microcosm of the convergences and divergences of interest in the government of education. Developments in its control and objectives will have implications for evaluation studies. Up to the present, Council evaluators have enjoyed a remarkable degree of freedom in the conduct of their work, although the Council exercises some degree of control over publication.

A less parochial perspective reveals that one of the most striking contemporary educational events in western industrialized societies is the forceful intervention of national government in the affairs of the school. Effective curriculum development has become an internationally recognized need, and evaluation will be a sought-after service in this effort. Evaluation costs money, and those who commission evaluation studies will be those who command resources. Who will serve the powerless if the evaluator flies the 'gold standard' (Stake, 1976, Chapter 20)? The independent foundations like Nuffield, Gulbenkian and Leverhulme may have an even more important role to play in the future than they have had in the past. Although their American equivalents have come under attack recently, accused variously of conservative conceptualizations, political meddling and ineptness, the independent sponsors may fulfil the need for checks and balances in changing power relationships.

One final point. The boundaries between educational and social programmes are becoming increasingly blurred; nursery provision, ethnic education and compensatory programmes are prime examples. Values seem likely to enter increasingly into the considerations of evaluators. There will be a place in the future for the three types of evaluation study outlined here, but there may be a special case for exploring in practice some of the principles which characterize the democratic model. For those who believe that means are the most important category of ends, it deserves refutation or support.