Work that might be contributed includes explorations of the theory that underpins, and of the public policy applications that arise from, different approaches to the reconciliation problem, for example:

• One approach seeks to retain the rational-choice foundation that informs existing welfare economics, treating apparent empirical anomalies as epiphenomena of behavioural economists’ techniques, and/or finding usefulness in preserving rational choice premises for the purpose of economics research agendas generally.  Theoretical work that reflects this approach might examine the extent to which experimental and other data can be interpreted as reflecting consistent revealed preferences in conjunction with feedback, learning, and other effects.  Applied work might examine ways of handling these effects in the conduct of policy appraisal: for example, how do we elicit ‘true’ preferences for public goods?
• A second approach is to treat at least some of the anomalies uncovered by behavioural economists as ‘real’ and normatively relevant.  Preferences that accord with non-standard models, such as prospect theory, may then be used as indicators of welfare.  A variant on this approach treats the preference model as descriptive and then, by classifying parameters as either normatively relevant or normatively irrelevant, uses it as the basis for constructing a measure of individual welfare.  Questions that arise within this approach include:  How credible is it to treat anomalies as preferences rather than mistakes?  What is the criterion for classifying characteristics of preference as normatively relevant, or irrelevant?  Can we separate these effects operationally?
• A third approach – recently termed libertarian paternalism – treats at least some anomalies as systematic mistakes and/or failures of self-control and seeks mechanisms that protect the individual from her mistakes and/or failures while still respecting her individual subjectivity.  Theoretical questions arise around the inference of ‘true’ preferences from actions that are clouded by mistakes and impulses, and applied questions arise in making this distinction operational.
• A fourth approach (endorsed by some advocates of libertarian paternalism as providing a criterion for the identification of ‘true’ preferences) replaces revealed preference with hedonic experience, happiness, as its standard of well-being.  Methods of measuring happiness are becoming increasingly rigorous and reliable, and concrete policy proposals are beginning to be grounded on the criterion of maximising happiness.  Questions that arise include:  How far does actual choice behaviour diverge from the behaviour prescribed by the happiness criterion, and hence, how much paternalism does this approach legitimate?  Do most individuals treat happiness as their maximands?  If not, is there an ethical foundation for treating happiness as the standard of well-being?  Can the happiness approach be translated into a practicable form of cost-benefit analysis?
• A fifth approach retains the pro-market, anti-paternalist thrust of traditional normative economics but derives this thrust from libertarian principles, or by replacing preference-satisfaction with opportunity as the standard of evaluation in normative reasoning.  Questions that arise include: Can opportunity be measured without introducing substantive assumptions about the nature of well-being, particularly when preferences are unstable?  Is there an ethical foundation for treating opportunity as the standard of evaluation?  Can the opportunity approach be translated into a practicable form of cost-benefit analysis?

Some papers may consider the implications for the reconciliation problem of endogenising the behaviour of governments, firms and other intermediaries.  For example:

• Public choice theory offers potentially useful perspectives on mechanism design and ‘constitutional political economy’.  One of the main contributions of public choice theory is to call into question the traditional orientation of welfare economics as addressed to a benevolent despot with the will and the power to correct ‘market failures’.  Arguably, the libertarian paternalist and happiness-based approaches revert to that orientation.  The public choice approach prompts questions such as:  If citizens make mistakes and lack self-control, can we still model the relationship of citizen to government as that of principal to agent?  What rules would such citizens choose to impose on their governments?  Does legitimating paternalistic policies provide new opportunities for ‘government failure’?
• Behavioural economics has tended to focus on the behaviour of individuals facing given choice problems; but in a market economy, the choice problems faced by consumers are largely determined by profit-seeking firms.  To what extent are firms able to exploit error-making or impulsive consumers?  Do the opportunities for this kind of exploitation strengthen the case for paternalistic regulation?  Or is competition an effective countervailing force?