HEGEL'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM

In studying logic, you hope to correct your present ideas of what reasoning is good, what bad. This, of course, must be done by reasoning .... Some writers fancy that they see some absurdity in this .... They say it would be a 'petitio principii' .... Let us rather state the case thus. At present you are in possession of a logica utens which seems to be unsatisfactory. The question is whether, using this unsatisfactory logica utens, you can make out wherein it must be modified, and can attain to a better system. This is a truer way of stating the question; and so stated, it appears to present no such insuperable difficulty, as is pretended.

--C. S. Peirce

I am convinced that progress in philosophy, as in science, can come only through continual mutual criticism, self-criticism, and attempts at improved approaches.

--R. Carnap

Preface ix

Acknowledgements xi

Note on Citations xii

INTRODUCTION 1

1 Problems of Knowledge and Problems with Epistemology 4

2 Descartes's Defense of the Metaphysical Certainty of Empirical Knowledge 18

3 Kant on the Objectivity of Empirical Knowledge 35

4 Some Aspects of Empiricism and Empirical Knowledge 47

5 William Alston on Justification and Epistemic Circularity 68

6 Some Basic Methodological Considerations of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit 91

7 Self-Criticism and Criteria of Truth 100

8 The Self-Critical Activity of Consciousness 115

9 Some Further Methodological Considerations 129

10 Hegel's Idealism and Epistemological Realism 140

11 The Structure of Hegel's Argument in the Phenomenology of Spirit 149

APPENDICIES

I Translation of the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit 189

II Paragraphs 14-16 of the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit in Parallel German and English 197

III The Triadic Structure of the Phenomenology of Spirit 201

IV Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Texts 204

V Analytical Table of Contents 207

Notes 213

Bibliography 288

Index of Names 305

Index of Subjects 307

The scope of this study is both ambitious and modest. One of its ambitions is to reintegrate Hegel's theory of knowledge into main stream epistemology. Hegel's views were formed in consideration of Classical Skepticism and Modern epistemology, and he frequently presupposes great familiarity with other views and the difficulties they face. Setting Hegel's discussion in the context of both traditional and contemporary epistemology is therefore necessary for correctly interpreting his issues, arguments, and views. Accordingly, this is an issues-oriented study. I analyze Hegel's problematic and method by placing them in the context of Sextus Empiricus, Descartes, Kant, Carnap, and William Alston.

I discuss Carnap, rather than a Modern empiricist such as Locke or Hume, for several reasons. One is that Hegel himself refutes a fundamental presupposition of Modern empiricism, the doctrine of "knowledge by acquaintance," in the first chapter of the Phenomenology, a chapter that cannot be reconstructed within the bounds of this study. Second, philosophers still tend to turn positivist when criticizing Hegel. Thus it is important to show that Carnap's program fails to handle the relevant problems. Third, I believe that Hegel has much to offer the contemporary philosophical scene. In this regard it is important to show that Hegel and (e.g.) Carnap are, after all, working within the same philosophical arena. Finally, Carnap is the last figure in the analytic tradition who addresses the relevant issues as issues in (or at least about and against) epistemology rather than formulating them mainly as issues in philosophy of language. Pursuing the issues of this study into contemporary philosophy of language would exceed manageable bounds.

Hegel's expositors face a difficult dilemma. Hegel's corpus is so vast that it is well neigh impossible to cover all the texts relevant to the issues of any particular investigation or to any one Hegelian text, so that an expositor risks omitting something crucial. On the other hand, attempting to treat Hegel's views synoptically inevitably leads to a superficial treatment of his particular statements and arguments, thus leaving an expositor at risk of misconstruction. It is my firm conviction that Hegel has suffered far too much from this second shortcoming. Attempts to treat his philosophy, or even one of its major components, synoptically has led expositors to misconstrue Hegel's views, sometimes drastically. Hegel insists that there is no way to understand the very pungent and suggestive (and sometimes absurd) statements he makes in the latter parts of his expositions without understanding how the meaning of his terms and the justification of his statements have been developed from the beginning of his discussion. I'm convinced that Hegel needs to be taken at his word about this point. To do this, however, requires understanding how he proposes to develop his points from the beginning to the end of any one of his expositions. To follow his development of his views thus requires what has seemed most difficult of all: to follow the development of his arguments from one statement to the next, and from one paragraph to the next.

This study provides a complete, detailed analysis and reconstruction of an important portion of one of Hegel's most important texts. The portion I consider, principally the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit, concerns Hegel's philosophical aims and method in the Phenomenology. Thus the purpose of this study is to provide a detailed understanding of his procedure in the Phenomenology of Spirit, an interpretation intended to facilitate an exacting and philosophically sensitive reading of Hegel's very interesting book. The modesty of the present study lies in its subtitle: It is a study of the aim and method of Hegel's Phenomenology, and not an exhaustive treatment of his whole book.

What many may find surprising is my contention that the "absolute idealist" Hegel defends the view that there is a way the world is that does not depend on our cognitive or linguistic activity and that we can know the way the world is. Hegel's idealism is an ontological holism that is, and is intended to be, consistent with what I call "epistemological realism." This view is obviously a realism. I call it "epistemological realism" in order to draw attention to the fact that this view involves both an ontological thesis--there is a way the world is which does not depend on our cognitive or linguistic activity; and an epistemological thesis--we can know the way the world is. Providing this label distinguishes this view, as an issue in epistemology, from what is called "scientific realism," the view that the theoretical entities posited by scientific theories exist. Hegel has views which bear on the issue of scientific realism, but they cannot be discussed at length in this study. Hegel's issue is the Modern issue of the "external world," the existence of which is typically granted in debates about scientific realism. This is also to say, Hegel's issues are prior to those concerning scientific realism. It is thus important to note that Hegel's criterion of truth analyzed in this study concerns the truth of epistemological theories of knowledge, and neither does nor is designed to apply to problems of theory selection or the underdetermination of theory by observation.⁽¹⁾

Those who find incredible my contention that Hegel is an epistemological realist might first read G. W. Cunningham's essay, "The Significance of the Hegelian Conception of Absolute Knowledge."⁽²⁾ Cunningham valiantly attacks numbers of mistaken impressions of Hegel's philosophy, many of which still have unwarranted currency today. Henry Harris, Hegel's most dedicated and sensitive expositor, remarks:

The balance of social influence has shifted so drastically between Hegel's time and ours ... from the religious to the scientific establishment, that Hegel's own contribution to this shift has itself become an obstacle to the right understanding of what he said. He wanted to swing religious consciousness into full support of a scientific interpretation of human life .... His own choice of language was conditioned by the Christian teaching, but also by the knowledge that the Christian doctrine of spirit was derived from Stoic sources.⁽³⁾

The Stoics were, of course, thoroughgoing materialists and naturalists. Strong evidence of Hegel's epistemological realism is interlaced throughout Harris's magnificent reconstruction of Hegel's early metaphysics, logic, and philosophy of nature. The present study aims to establish a proper understanding of Hegel's mature approach to defending epistemological realism in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and so to provide access to Hegel's very interesting views about empirical knowledge and its philosophical analysis.

Is there a way the world is regardless of how we think about it? If so, can we know the way the world is? Is knowledge a socio-historical phenomenon? Various philosophers in various periods have answered these questions differently, but rarely has it been thought that all three questions could be answered affirmatively. Hegel holds the controversial position that all three questions can be answered affirmatively. In so doing, Hegel rejects both skepticism--there may be a way the world is, but we can't know it--and what I call "subjectivism"--we can know the way the world is, but its structure or characteristics depend upon our cognitive or linguistic activity. I argue that Hegel defends what I call "epistemological realism": we can know the way the world is, even though it is not dependent upon our cognitive or linguistic activity. Many may find my contention surprising, but what is interesting is that he defends this realism by grounding it in a social and historical account of empirical knowledge.

Hegel recognizes that his position is controversial, and he recognizes that any position on these issues makes claims to know what empirical knowledge is. For these reasons, Hegel addresses a question that no one else has faced so directly: How can a theory of empirical knowledge be shown to be true, and so end the controversy within epistemology, without begging the question? One aim of Hegel's Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit is to pose this question in the course of enumerating some desiderata of any successful theory of empirical knowledge. The chief aim of his Introduction is to sketch a method for answering this question while providing an account of empirical knowledge that meets the desiderata he establishes. The main aim of the present study is to elucidate the desiderata Hegel establishes for the adequacy of any theory of empirical knowledge and to reconstruct the method Hegel proposes for meeting those desiderata.

Reconciling epistemological realism with a socially grounded theory of knowledge is a large project. It is a project that Hegel carries out not only through the whole of the Phenomenology, but also in his philosophy of mind and social philosophy.⁽⁴⁾ The full sweep of Hegel's project cannot be adequately recounted within the bounds of a single study. However, three important steps towards reconstructing Hegel's theory of empirical knowledge are made here. The first of these is to show that Hegel's project is to reconcile realism and a socio-historically grounded theory of knowledge. The second is to note several theses about knowledge and theories of knowledge, implied by Hegel's methodo-logical considerations in the Introduction, which are important for reconciling realism with a socially grounded theory of knowledge. The third is to set out the structure of Hegel's argument in the Phenomenology for a socio-historically grounded realist theory of knowledge.

Hegel's approach to these issues can best be understood by examining them in relation to three familiar, classic theories of knowledge: Rationalist Foundationalism, Critical Philosophy, and Empiricism. Hegel derives his epistemological desiderata from reflection on earlier theories of knowledge and on the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus. After summarizing Sextus's skeptical challenges to empirical knowledge and to epistemological claims about empirical knowledge, I show that, consciously or not, Descartes, Kant, Carnap, and William Alston each respond to the skeptical problems Sextus poses. Demonstrating that these skeptical challenges are common concerns among Hegel and these other epistemologists helps reintegrate Hegel's views with the main stream of theory of knowledge. I further emphasize the importance of Sextus's challenges by showing that Descartes, Kant, and Carnap each failed to handle them. I argue further that William Alston's view of the justification of epistemological claims about empirical knowledge fails to rebut Sextus's challenges to the justification of such claims and that his view supplies insufficient answers to some important questions. I then show that Hegel's method for analyzing empirical knowledge can handle both Sextus's challenges to empirical knowledge and his challenges to the justification of epistemological claims about empirical knowledge, and that it supplies more thorough answers to the questions left unresolved in Alston's view of the justification of epistemological claims.

Two more benefits are offered by examining these other theories of knowledge here. I argue that in their failures to answer Sextus's challenges, Descartes, Kant, and Carnap violate one or another of the desiderata Hegel establishes for epistemology. This shows that Hegel's desiderata carry important philosophical weight. One charge Hegel makes against traditional epistemology is that epistemologists have answered Sextus at the first-order level of concerns about empirical knowledge only to fall prey to Sextus's charges of circularity, dogmatism, or question-begging at the second-order level of concerns about the status of philosophical theories of knowledge. I show that Descartes, Kant, and Carnap are guilty of Hegel's charge. Part of Hegel's response to this is to hold that philosophical theories of knowledge must be knowable in accordance with their own principles.⁽⁵⁾ I show that Hegel's requirement of reflexive self-consistency undoes both Kant's and Carnap's rejections of realism.

A key tenet in Hegel's program for overcoming "subjectivism" (the view that the way the world is depends upon our cognitive or linguistic activity) is to reject the common tendency within epistemology to hold empirical knowledge claims answerable to philosophical theories about what empirical knowledge is. This tendency is due to granting epistemology priority over ontology. I show that Descartes, Kant, and Carnap did grant epistemology priority over ontology, and that this priority generates subjectivist accounts of knowledge in each of these cases.

Examining the failure of each of these theories of knowledge also provides an occasion for explaining and defending some important substantive points in Hegel's own theory of knowledge. Discussing the failure of Descartes's foundationalism allows me to show Hegel's rejection of the Modern Way of Ideas, and it allows me to show that Hegel's theory of knowledge is a deliberate alternative to foundationalism, in part because he rejects the ideal of incorrigibility and adopts fallibilism. Discussing Kant allows me to show that Hegel rejects transcendental idealism, an important point for understanding Hegel's own brand of "idealism," and also to suggest that transcendental arguments might be made independently of transcendental idealism, which is what Hegel proposes to do. Discussing Carnap allows me to show that there has been considerable confusion concerning "correspondence" as a criterion of truth and as an analysis of truth. Rejecting the former does not entail rejecting the latter. More importantly, I show that Hegel was well aware of the issues in philosophy of mind that engendered this non sequitur, namely, the recognition that we're incapable of "knowledge by acquaintance" and so are incapable of using correspondence as a criterion of truth. It is an explicit aim of Hegel's argument to reconcile a correspondence analysis of truth with a complex social philosophy of mind, a philosophy of mind incompatible with "knowledge by acquaintance." A final important point, implied by Hegel's analysis of self-criticism, is the rejection of descriptionalist theories of reference, that is, of the linguistic heirs to the Fregean slogan that "sense determines reference." Such theories of reference figure prominently in many current arguments against realism. Hegel holds that this is only part of the story concerning reference, and that because it is only part of the story, we're in a position to critically revise the descriptionalist "senses" of our terminology.

The third step towards reconstructing Hegel's theory of empirical knowledge made in this study is to outline the structure of his argument for epistemological realism and its social bases as he propounds it in the Phenomenology. On Hegel's view, knowledge as a social phenomenon is possible because it is an activity engaged in a naturally structured world. By explicating this natural basis, Hegel avoids subjectivism in the course of developing his social account of empirical knowledge.

Hegel's Introduction divides into three parts. The first part sets out the problems Hegel address in the Phenomenology and his desiderata for their successful solution. A second part sketches the structure of Hegel's "phenomenological" program answering these problems and meeting these desiderata. A final part concerns the course and results of Hegel's argument as it is carried out. Hegel's Introduction is as brief as it is wide-ranging, so that considerable stage-setting and reconstruction is required in order to understand it. This study attempts to provide that reconstruction, and thus to provide access to Hegel's very interesting views about empirical knowledge and its philosophical analysis presented in the Phenomenology of Spirit.

The problems Hegel addresses and his desiderata for their solution are set out in Chapter One. This chapter analyzes the first part of Hegel's Introduction in connection with some general features of Modern epistemology and in close consideration of Sextus Empiricus. The character and significance of Hegel's issues are elaborated in Chapters Two through Five, which examine his problems and desiderata by analyzing their bearing on Descartes, Kant, Carnap, and Alston. The second and third parts of Hegel's Introduction, concerning the structure of his "phenomenological" program and the course of the argument he presents in the Phenomenology, are analyzed and reconstructed in Chapters Six through Nine. Chapter Ten sketches Hegel's basic ontology, showing that Hegel's "idealism" is an ontological holism that is, and is intended to be, fully consistent with epistemological realism. Chapter Eleven analyzes the structure of Hegel's argument presented in the Phenomenology for epistemological realism and the social and historical bases of empirical knowledge.

Table of Contents vii

Preface ix

Acknowledgements xi

Note on Citations xii

INTRODUCTION 1

ONE Problems of Knowledge and Problems with Epistemology 4

I. Knowledge as an "Instrument" or a "Medium" 4

II. Four Assumptions of Epistemology 6

III. The Problem of Adjudicating Between Fundamentally Different Conceptual Schemes 10

IV. Some Principles of Pyrrhonian Skepticism 11

A. Some Distinctions Between Appearance and Reality 11

B. Skepticism and Representational Theories of Perception 12

C. The Problem of Regress and Circularity 13

D. The Dilemma of the Criterion 14

E. Contraposition Arguments 15

F. Knowledge, Truth, and Suspension of Judgment 15

V. Summary and Prospects 16

TWO Descartes's Defense of the Metaphysical Certainty of Empirical Knowledge 18

I. Descartes's Problematic 18

A. Introduction 18

B. Descartes's Dilemma 19

C. Descartes's Argument for the Truth of Clear and Distinct Ideas 20

D. The Problem of Circularity 21

E. Four Cartesian Doctrines 21

1. Representationalism 21

2. The Divine Creation of Eternal Truths 22

3. Denotative and Connotative Aspects of Ideas 22

4. Logical Voluntarism 22

II. Five Circularities in Descartes's Argument 23

A. Circularity and Logical Voluntarism 23

B. Circularity and the Denotation of Ideas 25

C. Circularity and Descartes's Inability to Disbelieve What is Clear and Distinct 26

D. Circularity and the Transparency of Descartes's Self-Knowledge 26

E. Circularity and the Self-Verification of Descartes's Thinking Nature 27

III. Some Defenses of Descartes 28

A. Doubt, Circularity, and Memory 28

B. The Didactic Aim of the Meditations 29

C. The Absurdity of Questioning One's Highest Cognitive Faculty 29

IV. Some Inherent Limits of the Cartesian Program 30

A. Representationalism and Skepticism 30

B. The Paucity of Self-Evident Foundations 31

C. The Untenability of "Self-Evidence" 32

D. Subjectivism and the Priority of Epistemology 34

THREE Kant on the Objectivity of Empirical Knowledge 35

I. Introduction 35

II. Kant's Copernican Response to Skepticism 35

III. Kant's Subjectivism 38

IV. Kant's Direct Argument for Transcendental Idealism 39

V. Criticism of Kant's Direct Argument for Transcendental Idealism 41

VI. Reflexive Difficulties with Kant's First Critique 43

VII. Coda: Hegel's Debt to Kant 46

FOUR Some Aspects of Empiricism and Empirical Knowledge 47

I. Introduction 47

II. Empiricism and Non-Conceptual Apprehension of Objects 48

III. Some Principles of Empiricism 48

IV. Carnap's Empiricism 50

• Summary of Carnap's Attempt to Undo the Issue of Epistemological Realism 50

B. Carnap's Mature Views on Criteria of Meaningfulness and on Realism 51

V. Criticism of Carnap's Program 56

A. Syntactical Analysis Must be Supplemented by Semantic Analysis 56

B. The Inadequacy of Carnap's Psychology of Observation Sentences 57

C. Carnap's Relapse To Non-Conceptual Apprehension of Objects 59

D. Carnap's Implicit Criteria of Truth: Truth within a Specified Formally

(Re)Constructed Language 60

E. Carnap's Subjectivism 60

F. Carnap's Failure to Diagnose the Source of Difficulties with

Epistemological Realism 62

G. Carnap's Failure to Undo the Issue of Epistemological Realism 64

H. Reflexive Difficulties Facing Carnap's Program 66

VI. Coda: Hegel's Sensitivity to the Source of Difficulties with Epistemological

Realism 67

FIVE William Alston on Justification and Epistemic Circularity 68

I. Introduction 68

II. Alston's Rejection of "Perspectival Internalism" 69

III. Alston's Defense of an "Epistemic" Conception of Justification 70

IV. Alston on the "Internality" of Justification 71

V. Alston on the Justificatory Regress Argument 72

VI. Alston on the Justification of Epistemic Principles 74

VII. Rebuttal of Alston's Objection Concerning Doxastic Voluntarism 76

VIII. Rebuttal of Alston's Objections to the Dilemma of the Criterion 78

IX. The Problem of Epistemic and Logical Circularity 83

X. Alston's Rejection of "Fully Reflective Justification" 85

XI. Alston's Criteria for Evaluating Epistemic Principles 86

XII. Some Strategic Suggestions for Justifying Epistemic Principles 87

SIX Some Basic Methodological Considerations of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit 91

I. Review and Summary 91

II. Forms of Consciousness 92

III. Natural Ideas 94

IV. Apparent Knowledge 95

V. Criticism, Empirical Knowledge, and Transcendental Knowledge 96

A. Criticism and the Analysis of Empirical Knowledge 96

B. Intellectual History and the "A Priori" Character of the Phenomenology

of Spirit 97

VI. Three Points of View 98

VII. Forms of Consciousness and "Observed Consciousness" 98

VIII. The Dilemma of the Criterion Revisited 99

SEVEN Self-Criticism and Criteria of Truth 100

I. Introduction 100

II. The Self-Critical Structure of Consciousness 100

A. Common Sense and Knowledge as a Relation 100

B. Knowledge as a Relation and the Circle of Appearances 102

C. The "In-itself" as the Standard of Knowledge 103

D. The Eight Aspects of Knowledge as a Relation 103

1. Two Senses of "In-itself" 104

2. Some Grammatical Distinctions of Case 105

3. Consciousness as Reflexive; The List Doubled 106

III. Hegel's Criterial Inference 108

IV. The Aim of Knowledge 111

A. The Goal of the Self-Critical Process 111

B. Hegel's Avowal of the Correspondence Conception of Truth 112

C. "Correspondence" and Value Judgments 113

V. Criteria of Knowledge and Metaphysical Distinctions Between Appearance

and Reality 114

EIGHT The Self-Critical Activity of Consciousness 115

I. Introduction 115

II. Hegel's First Discussion of Consciousness' Self-Critical Activity 115

A. Self-Criticism and the Circle of Appearances 115

B. Some Interpretive Difficulties Concerning the Distinction Between

"the Object To Consciousness" and "the Object For Consciousness" 116

C. The "Alteration" of "the" Object 118

D. Revision of the Standard of Knowledge 119

III. Hegel's Second Discussion of Consciousness' Self-Critical Activity 119

A. The Structure of the Transition from one Form of Consciousness to the Next 120

B. Inversion and Determinate Negation 125

C. The "Necessity" of the Transitions 126

NINE Some Further Methodological Considerations 129

I. Introduction 129

II. Hegel's Conception of Experience 129

III. Dialectic, Principles, and Practices 131

IV. Hegelian Phenomenology and the Meno Paradox 132

V. Consciousness' Cognitive Motivations 133

VI. Phenomenology as a Methodological Skepticism 134

VII. Phenomenology as a "Science" 135

VIII. Hegelian Phenomenology and "Our Observation" 136

IX. Question-Begging and Hegel's Claims in the Introduction 137

X. The Problem of Completeness 138

TEN Hegel's Idealism and Epistemological Realism 140

I. Introduction 140

II. Hegel's Rejection of Subjective Idealism 140

III. Hegel's Idealism as Ontological Holism 141

IV. The Role of Hegel's Idealism in Defending Epistemological Realism 145

V. Objections to Epistemological Realism in Philosophy of Science 145

A. Induction and Skepticism 146

B. Theory Change and Change of Referents 146

C. The Underdetermination of Scientific Theory by Observation 148

ELEVEN The Structure of Hegel's Argument in the Phenomenology of Spirit 149

I. Introduction 149

II. The Unity of the Phenomenology 149

III. The Lineage of German Idealism; Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel 150

IV. The Structure of Hegel's Argument for Epistemological Realism 154

V. Summary of Hegel's Epistemological Argument in the Phenomenology of Spirit 155

APPENDIX I Translation of the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit 189

APPENDIX II Paragraphs 14-16 of the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit in Parallel German and English 197

APPENDIX III The Triadic Structure of the Phenomenology of Spirit 201

APPENDIX IV Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Texts 204

APPENDIX V Analytical Table of Contents 207

Notes 213

Bibliography 288

Index of Names 305

Index of Subjects 307

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.