This conference, organised by the Centre for Counselling Studies in association with the School of Philosophy was held on 8 – 11 July 2011 at the University of East Anglia
Most of the sessions were recorded, and these recordings can be accessed through the links in below. (Click on the presenter’s name to access the recording). We are very sorry that due to technical problems we have no recording of Sarah Luczaj’s paper or of the panel discussion between Rupert Read and John Heaton.
Theme
The purpose of this conference was to bring together philosophers who are interested in psychotherapy with psychotherapists and psychotherapy researchers who are interested in the philosophical foundations of their field.
The nature of psychotherapy is in many ways problematical. Current proposals for the statutory regulation of the field in the UK and other countries have led to much discussion of the nature of the discipline, for example about whether it can be subsumed under a ‘medical model’, or whether approaches should be primarily cognitive or experiential.
Some of the issues involved are of an empirical nature, but others raise conceptual and philosophical issues. Research in the area has tended to concentrate on empirical issues of process and outcome, but psychotherapy inevitably works with contested notions such as those of consciousness, mental illness, delusion, diagnosis and so on. Further, in the development of psychotherapy theory, technical or semi-technical concepts such as those of ‘the unconscious’, ‘experiencing level’, ‘cognition’, ‘information’, ‘archetype’, ‘self-concept’ have evolved, whose relationships to the concepts of everyday language and clinical practice are not always clear.
Keynote addresses
John Heaton (Philadelphia Association, London)
‘The human being is the best picture of the human soul’: The temptations of theory and the unconscious.
Hans Julius Schneider (University of Potsdam)
Can philosophy be therapeutic? Ludwig Wittgenstein and Eugene Gendlin
Papers
How does one ‘pull something out by the root’ in psychotherapeutic practice? Therapy versus medicine
Elinor Hållén
Uppsala University, Sweden
In this paper I wish to discuss the assumption underlying the statutory regulations: that psychotherapy is a health profession that can be subsumed under the medical model. I will base my paper partly on Freud’s description of psychotherapeutic practice as different in kind from medical practice in the introductory lectures. By discussing how medicine and therapy respectively can be taught, Freud gives expression to important differences in these practices. While the medical practice is easily demonstrable since it is based on perceptual observations that even an untrained eye can make, there are no such easily demonstrable facts at the basis of therapeutic practice. Further, since the therapeutic practice is only possible in a situation where the patient feels safe it is not possible to learn by observing the therapeutic conversation as a by-stander. These and more are characteristics that distinguish the therapeutic practice from the medical practice. Instead of understanding therapy as a part of medicine I will discuss the remarks Wittgenstein makes about therapy as aesthetic, as a practice involving skilfully made interpretations, comparisons, ways of drawing the patient’s attention to certain aspects etc. The psychoanalytic practice is different from science in that the explanation that helps the patient is not a discovery – an objective fact found in empirical research – but the therapeutic conversation is at the base interpretation. When successful it is a joint achievement where the analyst helps the patient to see her reactions and behaviours as meaningful expressions.
Madness, Badness and Immaturity: Some Conceptual Issues in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy
Edward Harcourt
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford
and Keble College, Oxford
In the background of this paper lies the idea that the developmental thinking characteristic of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy (‘psychoanalysis’ for short) is all of a piece with a philosophical tradition of thought, going back to Plato and Aristotle, about human nature, human excellence and the good life for human beings. That is, psychoanalysis is to be understood in part as belonging to what has become known as ‘virtue ethics’.
The aim of the paper is to explore one way in which this idea might be spelled out in detail. First of all, I identify some contrasting pairs of terms which play an organizing role in psychoanalysis, especially in its more ‘relational’ (and less classically Freudian) varieties: for example ‘infantile dependence’ vs ‘mature dependence’ (Winnicott), ‘individuation’ and its contraries (Mahler), ‘undifferentiation’ and ‘differentiation’ (Loewald), and so on. Though these terminologies are not synonymous, in their respective home theories each is meant to define two contrasts: between maturity and immaturity, and between psychic health and psychopathology. I argue that this is too much weight for any terminology to bear. However, the proper reaction to this is not to abandon the terminology, but to try to achieve a proper understanding of what it means.
The argument proceeds as follows. First it is argued that the ‘health’ and ‘pathologies’ in question are properly speaking ethical, not medical, notions. Relatedness to others is to be seen on analogy with (say) the giving and taking of money in Aristotle’s account of liberality, as a ‘field’ in which it is possible to define a particular ethical excellence (in Betty Joseph’s words, ‘real relating, in which the other is seen as separate’) and its corresponding defects (for example ‘merger’ with another, or cut-offness based on fear of merger).
However, this initial move makes things worse rather than better, as long as the claim that the psychoanalytic terminologies also express a maturity/immaturity contrast is left in place. For the implication of a medical understanding of the terms - that normal maturation is a progress from pathology to health - gives way, on an ethical understanding, to the view that normal maturation is a progress from a form of badness to a form of goodness. But this view, though surprisingly widespread in the literature of psychoanalysis, is not defensible, as can be seen from observations of a kind which psychoanalysis itself (ironically) has specialized in making – the mutuality and reciprocity involved in mother-infant interactions at their best, even at a very early age.
But there is no doubt that an infant, even when all is at its best, cannot (for example) express concern for the mother’s welfare. But isn’t this a mark of ‘real relating, in which the other is seen as separate’? And so isn’t a certain kind of ethical defect the norm in infancy after all? To answer this worry, we need to make room in our conception of human excellences and defects – as Aristotle and contemporary ‘virtue ethics’ do not – for a distinction between traits of character that are manifestable at any phase in the life-span (non-phase-specific traits), and those that are manifestable only at a particular (loosely defined) phase (phase-specific traits). ‘Real relating, in which the other is seen as separate’ is non-phase-specific, but it has counterparts in each phase – for example, its counterpart in maturity is love, as roughly defined by Aristotle’s five marks in Nicomachean Ethics VIII. The rich variety of ways in which infants relate to their mothers (or other primary caregivers) show that concepts of ethical excellences and defects have application even to the very young. Once we grasp the distinction between phase-specific and non-phase-specific traits of character, we can see that what it’s tempting to mistake for an infantile defect in the ‘field’ of relatedness to others (as, in the example, absence of concern for the mother’s welfare) is in fact consistent with the corresponding infantile excellence of character, namely the phase-specific counterpart for infancy of ‘real relating’. So egotism is no more the norm in infancy than is ‘narcissism’.
Finally, the ideals of human relatedness which can be seen to be embodied in the psychoanalytic terminology of ‘individuation’ (etc.) when these are properly understood are compared to similar ideals in Aristotle, Iris Murdoch, and Kant.
Meta-theory, basic model, integrative perspective or overarching vision: exploring the significance of Gendlin’s Process Model for development of practice and clarification of theory in counselling and psychotherapy
Martin Langsdon
Centre for Counselling Studies, UEA
Philosophical ideas and perspectives can be seen as interacting with the theory and practice of psychotherapy in a wide variety of ways. While some approaches to psychotherapy depend rather explicitly on a particular philosophical viewpoint, other approaches eschew philosophical reflection on core ideas and principles.
Gendlin’s philosophy of the implicit has been seen as meta-theory which assists one’s appreciation and evaluation of specific theories of therapy. On the other hand, his ‘Process Model’ can be seen as something of a theory in its own right, and focusing, as a practice that has grown directly from the philosophy, would seem to be something that might compete with other comparable practices.
This paper will consider the issue of whether Gendlin’s philosophy is rightly seen as a meta-theory, or another theory, or both, by considering issues that arise in understanding Process-Experiential Therapy (also known as Emotion-Focused Therapy).
Focusing in Spiritual and Neuroscientific Contexts
Sarah Luczaj
Centre for Counselling Studies, UEA
Currently, there seems to be a split between scientific views based upon a mechanical body, a material brain which somehow produces consciousness, and 'spiritual views', usually countering materialist views with metaphysical ones.
Gendlin's 'Process Model' presents concept-making from our conscious experience, in our bodies, rather than trying to make our living bodies fit the over-applied scientific concepts, which divide the world into separate units. Starting from the principle "interaction first", Gendlin makes concepts from our lives as we already know them, interacting processes, always moving forward.
Focusing is a practice based in the body, but not a mechanical body "plus" consciousness. The living body which we know, holds an unclear sense of the whole situation we are in. Focusing, a way of examining this sense, was discovered in the practice of psychotherapy, and is used as a method of moving through stuckness of various kinds.
Hence focusing provides an alternative world-view/experience, which neither denies the usefulness of the scientific investigation of parts, e.g. of the brain for appropriate purposes, nor takes a metaphysical stance.
From neuroscientific perspectives, research such as Damasio's on 'self' may provide information on how focusing works in the material body. I also suggest that awareness of person and world as interactive, ultimately inseparable processes, can be similar to a spiritual awareness, particularly the Buddhist concept of 'no-self'.
The peaceful co-existence in Gendlin's philosophy of the scientific 'units' model with the 'process' model of actual experience, seems particularly important at this moment in time.
Moreno’s thing-beside-itself: Is psychodrama yet another offspring of Apollonian-Dionysian coupling?
John Mcginn
UEA
Moreno’s pioneering text Psychodrama (1946) develops a manifesto that is steeped in a philosophical heritage. He refers to Nietzsche indirectly via Kantian terminology:
According to Kant ‘das Ding an sich’ is the noumenon or the thing-in-itself, underlying and in opposition to the phenomena of our limited experience. Psychodrama, das Ding ausser sich means ‘‘the thing beside itself’’, so to speak the noumenon which has become a phenomenon, or a phenomenon which has turned into the noumenon (Moreno 1946, p.12).
Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy (1872) equates the Apollonian impulse in the discipline of aesthetics with Schopenhauer’s world as representation, which in turn parallels Kant’s notion of the phenomenal world of appearance. Similarly, the complementary Dionysian force (completely non-representational), for Nietzsche, is analogous to Schopenhauer’s world as will, which in turn corresponds to the Kantian noumenal world or thing-in-itself.
The principal argument of The Birth of Tragedy is that Attic tragedy is an offspring of an unprecedented Apollonian-Dionysian coupling: where Apollonian visible, auditory form (i.e. dramatic structure, action, image and dialogue of lyrical poetry etc) acts as a platform to illuminate (but also channel and harness) Dionysian formless flux, mystical intuition and mythic rapture. In other words, a metamorphosis of the phenomenon into the noumenon and vise versa, creating the thing-beside-itself.
Like Attic tragedy, then, psychodrama channels psychic, mythic spontaneity or Dionysian boundlessness through Apollonian form (drama technique and method). What follows will be a critical comparison of Greek tragedy and psychodrama.
Furthermore, this paper will also examine whether mentalization (a recent rationalist, cognitive movement in psychotherapy, which can be fused with psychodrama) could be construed as being analogous to the Socratic-Euripidean pact, which Nietzsche so abhors in the historical trajectory of tragedy; and whether such a fusion could be considered as undermining the purity of the thing-beside–itself: signalling the death of psychodrama.
Gendlin’s philosophy of the implicit
Tadayuki Murasato
Teikyo Heisei University, Tokyo
Kant had to hold that experience (sensibility) presupposes thinking (intellect) in his exploration of the problem of how we have the right to make claims to scientific truth.
Dilthey criticized this and claimed our experience contains forms and orders. Heidegger reversed Descartes’ saying ’I think therefore I am’ into ‘I am therefore I think’. And he modified Husserl’s phenomenology which wanted the rigor of knowledge as much as Descartes did, and said phenomenology was actually hermeneutics of the facts. Eugene Gendlin had the intention of reforming phenomenology into his philosophy of the implicit, from which Focusing and Thinking at the Edge (TAE) were derived. I want to argue that his philosophy comes from his own experiences as a person and as a clinical psychologist, together with the traditional stream of phenomenology mentioned above, Wittgenstein’s reform in linguistic philosophy, and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body. Focusing and TAE are likely to be trivialized unless we give enough attention to this philosophy.
Opening the lid of the psychotherapeutic space: An autoethnographic exploration of the experience of psychotherapy
Kate Nobbs
Private practice, Rotterdam
While the essential focus of psychotherapy is the health and well being of the client, attention also needs to be given to maintaining and supporting the wellbeing of the psychotherapist. In the context of insurance based practice, ideas and possibilities will be discussed to support not only the survival of the psychotherapist, but the flourishing of what can now be considered an endangered species.
Psychotherapy as a practice in the Netherlands is administered within a system that necessitates seeing the client as "broken". Within a completely medical and health insurance based context the art of psychotherapy is under siege. The technologies of this system employ surveillance and control to track what the therapist is doing with the client using transparency as justification. Confidentiality and non structuralist ways of working with the clients are just two of the casualties. Non conformity and resistance has been outlawed by making psychotherapy practiced outside this system, illegal.
Using autoethnography methodology, the experience of the psychotherapist under this regime will be explored. The effects on the personal philosophy of psychotherapy of the therapist and the survival of a non-structuralist narrative influenced psychotherapist will be examined. The contamination of the sacred space of psychotherapy will be explored.
Reflections on the Inner Act
Donata Schoeller
ETH, Zürich
According to Wittgenstein, Austin and Ryle speaking of an ‘inner act' is problematic. It invites representational and mentalistic background images leading to philosophical misunderstandings concerning what ‘we do with words’. Psychotherapy (e.g. Focusing-oriented Psychotherapy) and artists (e.g. Stanislavski) on the other hand stress the importance of an inner act to attain a different kind of expression and explication. I want to confront those different kinds of views and ask how a psychotherapeutic and also artistic context can inspire the philosophical discussion on the topic. Whereas ordinary language philosophy offers ordinary phrases to show what we mean by what we say, Eugene Gendlin takes ordinary speaking situations to demonstrate cases, where what we mean requires an inner act to say it. For instance: to remember, what we wanted to say or to rephrase what we mean, when we are misunderstood, we need to concentrate on ‘something’. By introducing new sorts of concepts Gendlin tries to do justice to an ‘inner act’ without falling back into a double life legend. A process view taking account of a vague ‘felt sense’, that might be carried forward into an expression, substitutes a representational view on language.
From here, I want to reflect the creative and individual aspect of meaning as a complement to the social dimension of language-games. Dilthey and Cavell suggest the eminent role played by the individual story in the constitution of meanings of words. If our biographies do inspire the meaning of words, and these words again help us ‘open up’ (Adorno) the meaning of our continuing individual stories, an intricate interplay of lived experience and experienced symbols will have to be considered. This again brings us back to Gendlin’s conceptual proposals, which have to be critically discussed concerning the question how to reconcile the private and the social dimension of language.
Some odd concepts in Gendlin’s Process Model and their clinical implications
Yasuhiro Suetake
Hosei University, Tokyo
This presentation is one of my continuing studies (Suetake, 2010; Suetake, 2011) on Gendlin’s A Process Model (Gendlin, 1997). The Process Model (PM) is a philosophical work that is constructed of a variety of new terms, and it includes some concepts we cannot understand easily by our ordinary thinking mode. In this presentation, let me start with examining some gradual and evolutional ‘rather odd’ concepts; i.e. ‘occurring into implying’, ‘stoppage’, ‘leafing’, ‘versioning’ etc., and then I try to elucidate the meanings of some ‘quite odd’ concepts for referring to greater and more jumpable change of organism, such as ‘en#0’, ‘everything by everything (evev)’, ‘intervening events’, ‘open cycle’, ‘implicit functioning’, and ‘held’ in the PM.
I also attempt to extract the clinical implications that these concepts bring to psychotherapy, especially to the therapeutic work with clients who seem to be difficult to change. In order to do so, I discuss the relevance of these odd concepts in the PM to some therapeutic concepts in Gendlin’s writings on psychotherapy, including ‘A theory of personality change’ (Gendlin, 1964) and Focusing-oriented psychotherapy (Gendlin, 1996).
Furthermore, I would like to discuss how we Japanese could recover ourselves newly and truly from the shock of the massive earthquake and tsunami disaster, especially in terms of the PM’s philosophical and clinical perspective.
What occurs in person-centred and focusing-oriented therapy?: A qualitative analysis by using ‘therapist TAE’
Satoko Tokumaru
Japan Women's College of Physical Education, Tokyo
and
Yasuhiro Suetake
Hosei University, Tokyo
The purpose of this presentation is to show an application of TAE (thinking at the edge) (Gendlin & Hendricks, 2004) to qualitative research methodology, in particular the ‘therapist TAE’ which TAE approach is arranged for therapists to examine their own therapeutic practice, and to illustrate some outcomes of a pilot study in progress using ‘therapist TAE’.
One of the presenters (Tokumaru, 2010) has been developing some qualitative research methods adopting TAE. Through her examination, she found that a TAE session could make psychotherapists be aware of certain significant meanings to themselves in their therapy. Then she devised the TAE session for therapists, and named this approach ‘therapist TAE’. In ‘therapist TAE’, having the assistance of a TAE guide, the therapist analyzes his/her own experiences and interactions with the clients in his/her therapy, and attempts to theorize new concepts for therapeutic phenomenon.
In our pilot study, another presenter’s experiences as a person-centred and focusing-oriented therapist with 6 clients, and recordings for these therapies, are analyzed. We report the process of the therapist TAE sessions and some outcomes obtained through this approach; for example some new concepts including ‘rhythmic individualizing’, ‘pre-constituted bodily implying’, ‘metaphoric lightening’, and ‘personal grammatical form’ are acquired.
Further we would also like to discuss the fertile possibilities and perspective of TAE methods and ‘therapist TAE’.
Torturous Thinking
Being Pain and Brokenness
Tony Wright
Freedom from Torture, UK
“There are truths that can only be discovered through suffering or from the critical vantage point of extreme situations” Ignacio Martin Baro.
The survivor of torture can be the bearer of such truths.
Torture as an illegal and purposeful infliction of severe pain has the potential to break individuals, psychologically, emotionally, spiritually and behaviourally. The intensity and complexity of this experience presents a unique challenge to understand more fully clients’ experiences. Counselling/Psychotherapy and Philosophy are but two discourses through which to attempt this difficult task.
Working as a counsellor/psychotherapist with survivors of torture within the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, (newly renamed as Freedom from Torture) I have sought to make sense of what I am being told by clients when they identify a specific and highly significant moment in their experience of torture.
This paper presents a tentative and speculative understanding of an ‘ontological tipping point’ discernible through typological client statements about a fundamental and perhaps irreversible change in the person’s existence through the torture process. These typological statements will be contextualised through a short single case study.
Working from these client statements (truths from extreme vantage points) and the contextual case study, philosophical investigations of an ontological kind will be presented and will include:
- additional related client experiences of being, pain and brokenness
- intercultural understandings of ontological issues raised
- the challenges of modelling accurate philosophical understanding
- the challenge of developing appropriate counselling/psychotherapy rehabilitation best practice
Participants listening to this paper will be encouraged to dialogue about both the psychotherapeutic and philosophical dimensions of the paper’s content and its diverse meanings.
Forum: Felt sense and inner objects
Campbell Purton, Hans Schneider and Rupert Read
