| Job Title | Contact | Location |
|---|---|---|
| Senior Lecturer |
B dot Saha at uea dot ac dot uk
Tel: +44 (0)1603 59 3404 |
Arts 3.40 |
Bibhas Saha is Senior Lecturer of Economics in the School of Economics at UEA. He holds PhD in Economics, from the University of Southern California, USA, MA in Economics, from the University of Calcutta, India, and BA in Economics from the University of Burdwan, India. Earlier he was professor at Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, India and had visited the Department of Economics of the University of Southern California (2000-01) as Associate Professor.
His research covers issues like betting, corruption, privatization, wage bargaining, returns to education, child labour, and microfinance. He has published in refereed journals like Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Comparative Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Economica, Journal of Development Economics, Review of Development Economics, Journal of Economics, Bulletin of Economic Research, Economics Bulletin, Labour and Journal of Education and Work.
External
Bibhas has examined several PhD theses from various universities such as Jadavpur University, India, University of Birmingham and University of Nottingham. He has also refereed for the following journals: Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Economics and Politics, Southern Economic Journal, Journal of Economics, Review of Development Economics, Artha Vijnana, European Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, and Journal of South Asian Development.
Bibhas also has appeared on BBC Radio Norfolk Breakfast show on 6 July 2010 to discuss the problem of match-fixing and betting in popular sports.
Publications since 1 January 2001 (in reverse order)
Journal Articles
1. Match-Fixing under Competitive Odds (with Parimal Kanti Bag), 2011, Forthcoming, Games and Economic Behavior, 10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.001
2. Academic specialization and returns to education: Evidence from India (with Rudra Sensarma), 2011, Accepted, Journal of Education and Work
3. Mixed Ownership, Managerial Incentives and Bank Competition (with Rudra Sensarma) Bulletin of Economic Research, 2011, Forthcoming, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00354.x,
4. Product innovation and stability of collusion (with S.Poddar), Economics Bulletin, Bibhas Saha, 2010 May, http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2010/Volume30/EB-10-V30-I2-P129.pdf
5. Private tutoring, school education and government policy (with Subhra B. Saha), Review of Market Integration, 2009, vol. 1(3), 375-408.
6. Mixed ownership in a mixed duopoly with differentiated products, Journal of Economics, 2009, Volume 98, Issue 1 (2009), P. 25-43, DOI: 10.1007/s00712-009-0075-x
7. The redistributive role of managerial incentives in a mixed duopoly, (with Rudra Sensarma), Economics Bulletin, 2008, Vol. 12, No. 27, pp.1-10. URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume12/EB-08L10033A.pdf
8. Union-Oligopoly Bargaining and Entry Deterrence: A Reassessment of Limit Pricing, (with Rupayan Pal), 2008, Journal of Economics, Vol. 95 (2) , pp.121-147. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-008-0030-2
9. Spatial competition in a mixed duopoly with one partially privatized firm (with Ashutosh Kumar), 2008, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 36 No. 2, pp 326-341 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2007.03.001
10. Wage commitment, signalling and entry deterrence or accommodation, (with Rupayan Pal), 2006, Labour: Review of Labour Economics and Industrial Relations, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 625-650
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9914.2006.00355.x
11. School dropout and informal apprenticeship (with Padmini Dasgupta and Rudra Sensarma), 2006, India Macroeconomics Annual, pp.88-125
http://www.sagepub.in/browse/book.asp?bookid=1114&Subject_Name=&mode=3#t
12. Labour institutions in India and China: A tale of two nations, 2006, Journal of South Asian Development, Vol. 1 No. 2, pp. 179-205
http://sad.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/1/2/179
13. Extractive bribe and default in subsidized credit programs, 2006 (with Trivikraman Thampy), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, June Vol. 60, No. 2, pp. 182-204
14. Divestment and bank competition, 2004 (with Rudra Sensarma), Journal of Economics, Volume 81(3), pp. 223-247
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/712/2004/00000081/00000003/art
15. Harassment, corruption and tax policy: a comment, 2003, European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 19 (4), November 2003, pp. 893-897
16. Red tape, incentive bribe and the provision of subsidy, 2001 Journal of Development Economics, vol. 65, pp. 113-133
Book Chapters, Reports and Contributions to Collections/Proceedings
1 Iron rice bowl left behind in race to market, Book review in Times Higher Education Supplement, (25 May, 2007).
Abstract: For the sheer scale and the pace of transformation, the Chinese economic miracle will probably eclipse the other miracles of East Asia. In this miracle the labour market reform, famously known as withering away of the ‘iron rice bowl’, and the creation of a free labour market have both played a critical role. But labour reform involves new challenges, and benefits of such reform may not be equitably shared. Without understanding these tradeoffs, we may not be able to have a comprehensive assessment of China’s new economic policies.
2. Clean development mechanism: issues and options (with P.G. Babu and K.S. Kavi Kumar), in India and Global Climate Change Perspectives on Economics and Policy from a Developing Country, (eds. Michael A. Toman, Ujjayant Chakravorty, Shreekant Gupta,) Resources for the Future Press, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore (2003).
Abstract: We study some of the design issues related to Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) and the conceptually related notion of Joint Implementation and illustrate CDM options using the Indian cement sector. After a brief discussion of the potential size of the CDM market, we examine whether bilateral context of CDM facilitates or hinders the distribution of economic gains between the two participants. Towards this goal we discuss CDM between industries of the two countries and the related issue of governmental negotiations using a simple illustrative model. Given the fact that technology transfer is expected to form the nucleus of most of the CDM projects, we study some of the strategic factors involved in such transfer mechanisms. Finally, we conclude the paper with a discussion of issues such as transaction costs and political factors.
3. Industrial Labour: Five essays on the industrial development in India, (2003). Indira Gandhi National Open University, New Delhi (2003).
Abstract: This collection of five essays was prepared as study material for undergraduates students of a major distance learning program. It provides a broad discussion of India’s industrial growth, employment, labour laws and industrial disputes.
4. Is Bengal ready for re-industrialization? 10 June 2008,
This media piece argues that the land acquisition policy of the Government of West Bengal, India is unfair to the farmers and it needs to be rectified to fascilitate industrialisation in the state.
http://www.rediff.com/money/2008/jun/10guest.htm
Bibhas currently teaches Introductory Microeconomics and Development Economics. Previously he taught Economics for Business and Economics for International Business for UG students and Economic Theory I and Multinational Firms for PG students. He is currently supervising 2 PhD students. So far under his supervision 2 MPhil and 1 PhD students graduated at UEA.
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