I have worked on consultancy projects for DFID and AFD, and have taught at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels. 

I received my PhD in Economics from the University of Nottingham in the summer of 2010. 

CV and Experience

Click here to download Paul's CV.

http://sites.google.com/site/paulclist/

Development economics, development aid, applied econometric analysis.

Publications

(in print)  

25 Years of Aid Allocation Practice: Whither Selectivity? 
World Development, 39(10), pp. 1724-1734, 2011
The 4P framework (Poverty, Population, Policy, and Proximity) is introduced as a way of understanding a donor’s aid allocation. We use the two-part model and examine the period 1982–2006. The results indicate that recent conclusions of increasing selectivity are misplaced for the seven major donors analyzed, who together represent the majority of development aid. Indeed, the effect of each of the commonly mentioned time-trends (selectivity, the end of the Cold War, and the commencement of the Global War on Terror) is much smaller than the role of donor heterogeneity, which appears sizeable and entrenched.

Note: Working paper versions of this article are available under the title '25 Years of Aid Allocation Practice: Comparing Donors and Eras', Credit Working Paper 2009 (09/11) and CSAE Conference Paper 2010 (155)  The CREDIT WP contains more information on the choice between Two-Part, Heckman and Tobit models.  

Selectivity on Aid Modality: Determinants of Budget Support from Multilateral Donors (with Alessia Isopi and Oliver Morrissey)

Credit Working Paper, 11(1), 2011

Since the late 1990s a selection on policy approach to aid was advocated such that more aid should be allocated to countries with good policies. A number of donors accepted this recommendation, including the World Bank, but there is little evidence that this has occurred. Donors, including the World Bank, seem no more likely to use policy and governance indicators to determine the amount of aid allocated to particular recipients. This paper argues that donors may exercise selectivity over the aid modality. Specifically, multilateral donors (we consider only EC and WB) will cede more recipient control over aid by granting more budget support to those recipients with better service delivery systems and spending preferences (towards the poor) aligned with the donor. We test this for the EC and WB over 1997-2007 and find some support. The principal determinant of receiving budget support has been having a PRSP process in place, and this can be considered a good indicator of aligned preferences. Furthermore towards the end of the period (2005-07) there was some increase in the share of countries receiving budget support but then government effectiveness was also a determinant of eligibility, and having a PRSP increased the amount of budget support. Multilateral donors have been more likely to give budget support to countries with aligned spending preferences and better quality systems, even if they have not reallocated the total aid envelope in that way.

Aid and tax revenue: Signs of a positive effect since the 1980s
(with Oliver Morrissey)
Journal of International Development, 23(2), pp165-180, 2011
This paper addresses the effect of aid loans and grants on tax effort using data for 82 developing countries over 1970-2005. We find no robust evidence for a negative effect of aid (grants or loans) on the tax/GDP ratio, other than a contemporaneous correlation, but find some evidence that the effect of grants on tax revenue is positive (if significant) since the mid 1980s and that grants tend to increase tax revenue over the medium term. For poor aid recipients, grants are to be preferred to loans because they create no debt and have no adverse fiscal effects.

Forthcoming in World Development
Focusing on seven bilateral donors over a 25 year period, the paper answers 4 questions related to aid allocation practice. Questions one and two examine allocation differences between donors and time periods. Questions three and four relate to changes in poverty and policy selectivity. To answer these questions a formal approach is used to quantify the effects of four factors that influence aid allocation: poverty, policy, proximity and population. The results reaffirm findings of large donor heterogeneity and the role of non-development influences. However, they dispute recent findings of large or growing policy sensitivity.